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This Study deals with a theoretical economic analysis of 
cooperative organizations. This analysis will be restricted 
to considerations bearing directly and indirectly on 
efficiency problems at the levels of the firm (individual) 
and of a group of firms (group of individuals). The main 
objective is to investigate the economic reasons which 
theoretically explain the rapid growth of cooperative organi­
zations as substitutes for competitive organizations, as 
well as the inability of the cooperative system to supplant 
completely the competitive system in most economic areas. 
There is no universal definition of a cooperative as an 
economic entity; a variety of structures coexist, and there 
exist a lot of cooperative organizations essentially differ­
ent from each other. Their common characteristics can be 
summarized by the following definition. A cooperative 
organization is a voluntary coalition of persons who pool 
some of their resources together in an attempt to get a better 
outcome. As an economic entity, it has a firm structure. 
All cooperatives present the three aspects of the defini­
tion at a time. Bargaining cooperatives show an emphasis of 
the coalition aspect. Resource cooperatives are more con­
cerned with the pooling of resources. Firm cooperatives 
present a more definite firm structure. 
A complete analysis of the cooperative relative efficiency 
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implies a consideration of the three characteristics of the 
cooperative system. The way individuals group together into 
a coalition is important from an efficiency point of view. 
This aspect will be developed in relation to bargaining 
cooperatives with the help of decision making theory and of 
game theory. If we assume the existence of a coalition, 
it is then important to know how the resources are pooled 
together to judge the economic efficiency of the cooperative 
organization. This aspect will be considered in relation 
to resource cooperatives with the use of a programming 
approach. The study of the firm equilibrium of the coopera­
tive is another aspect directly related to the efficiency 
problem. This point will be analyzed in relation to firm 
cooperatives with the help of the classical economic approach. 
Hopefully these three pieces of analysis, apparently inde­
pendent, will combine together into a progressive considera­
tion of the global and individual efficiency problems within 
a cooperative system. 
Before developing the economic analysis of cooperative 
organizations, it may be interesting to consider some of the 
most important historical, philosophical and ethical con­
siderations relative this subject. 
David Hamilton observed two directions in the idea of 
human nature in the 17th and 18th centuries: 
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"One strand of thought, perhaps taking its lead from 
Hobbes, believed man to be individualistic and selfish. 
The other, best exemplified by Rousseau, held to the 
notion that man was basically cooperative by nature" 
(15) . 
Hamilton continued, considering that: 
"Standard economic theory, at least from the time of 
Smith, adhered to the notion that man was basically 
selfish... Under this doctrine it was assumed that 
private and public interests were identical. As Sir 
Bernard Mandeville contended in the Fable of the Bees, 
private vice was a public virtue" (15). 
The most attractive communist principle; "From each 
according to his abilities and to each according to his 
needs", had its foundations in Rousseau's human philosophy. 
It was put in application, perhaps too soon, with the un­
successful phalanstery in the 19th century, planned by the 
French socialist and reformer Jean Baptiste Fourier. 
A. K. Sen (38), considering the problem of distribution 
of wages in a cooperative enterprise relative to some general 
notion of utility and welfare, concludes: 
"Distribution purely according to 'needs' tends to re­
sult in an under-allocation of labor in the cooperative 
enterprise, and that purely according to 'work' tends 
to produce an over-allocation of it." 
The free development of an ultracooperative society 
based upon the distribution of economic goods among people 
according to 'needs' only leads, logically, to inefficiency 
and to self-destruction. Man does not seem to be as simple 
as Hobbes and Rousseau believed. A mixture of both pictures 
would more likely be closer to reality, but in which 
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proportions? 
According to the different beliefs about man's degree of 
selfishness, different propositions have been made concerning 
the social and economic characters of society to be adapted 
to him. The differences between Communist China's social and 
economic organizations and the capitalist countries' own organ­
izations are significant. All we can say from observation 
is that cooperation is often a poor individual's attitude to­
wards society. The positive correlation between the degree of 
mass poverty and its receptiveness to communism ideologies 
seems to prove this statement. Further, the success of com­
munistic structures is often endangered by the improvement in 
the economic well being of people. Premier Kosygin likely 
anticipated this when he asked for a considerable increase in 
mass participation in production management decisions, and 
for a generation in all workers of the feeling that they are 
the bosses for what concerns production (19). This emphasis 
on increasing the interest of workers in the production 
processes and on participating in management is not found 
only in Russia. General de Gaulle, after the May-June 1968 
crisis in France made statements quite similar to those 
attributed to Premier Kosygin. According to G. Lasserre (19), 
"One hopes that in a freer enterprise, and being them­
selves better interested, the workers would take better 
care about the success of the firm..." .1 
^Free translation from French. 
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The "participation" of workers in the management of the 
firm and their direct interest in the outcome of their work 
have always been the two fundamental principles of the labor 
cooperatives. 
If we look at the establishment of cooperatives around 
the world since the beginning of the twentieth century, we 
can appreciate the importance of this "new kind of business" 
which has partially supplanted the "invisible hand". After 
such a growth in the number of cooperatives, why is it that 
many economists and sociologists oppose this new economic 
and social system, showing its weakness and its dangers? 
Shoeck and Wiggins in The New Argument in Economics state: 
"... In order to grasp the genuine weakness of the 
collective farm system of the Soviet Union, as well as 
all sorts of so-called 'cooperative' farm enterprises 
in other countries, we must look at the form of their 
management. It is obviously impossible to conduct 
the decision-making on a firm by democratic procedure" 
(37) . 
J. L. Mey, writing about cooperatives, is more specific, 
and also somewhat cynical in his statement: 
"A democratic country may be governed by amateurs but 
perhaps it is very dangerous to state that this is 
also valid for an enterprise, in particular for an 
enterprise in a dymanic environment like ours" (26) . 
Attempts to evaluate cooperative systems are complicated 
by good and bad applications of principles of cooperation. A 
universal judgement on the system does not follow from 
criticisms of some more or less successful realizations. 
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Nevertheless, some writers, probably directly concerned about 
the cooperative organizations in particular countries, make 
some interesting statements about the evolution of their 
real working conditions. Y. Don, writing about the Israeli 
experience (9) considers that: 
"The voluntary aspect of cooperative and its particular 
devotion to the collectivity before the particular 
disappear as the organization and the initiative are 
more centralized." 
J. L. Mey, writing about cooperatives in western countries, 
observes : 
"... a tendency among cooperatives to move in the direc­
tion of the capitalistic concentration and to make 
mere stock-holders out of its members" (26). 
Desmond Flanagan, writing about the British cooperative 
movement since the Independence Commission (12), remarks 
that during the last decade the consumption cooperatives 
declined quite a bit, and that this was due mainly to the 
lack of interest of people in the democratic aspect of this 
organ i z at ion. 
In these criticisms of cooperative organizations, nothing 
reflects directly on the principles of cooperation. Only 
applications of these principles and their adjustments to 
real life where man is a man with his qualities and defects 
and with his cooperativeness and his selfishness are con­
sidered. 
These considerations about the cooperative organizations 
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justify the choice of the objective of this study in the 
sense that they show a lack of agreement of most people 
about the effectiveness (efficiency) of the cooperative 
system. 
It is obvious that most of the preceding considerations 
do not concern a unique form of cooperative. The cooperative 
concept the different authors consider is more specific than 
the very general concept we defined at the beginning of the 
study. This specific concept is more likely to be described 
by the definition given in the report of the inquiry on 
cooperative enterprise in Europe (32): 
"A cooperative enterprise is one which belongs to the 
people who use its services, the control of it rests 
equally with all the members, and the gains of which 
are distributed to the members in proportion to the 
use they make of its services." 
The cooperative principles given by J. Voorhis (44, p. 22) 
are summarized: 
"(1) Open membership. 
(2) Democratic control - one vote for each member-
owner, regardless of the number of shares held. 
(3) Limited return on invested capital. 
(4) All net savings distributed in proportion to 
patronage." 
We will not develop further the social aspects of the 
cooperative system nor get into polemics about the doctrinal 
attributes of such an economic organization. There is much 
more to be said in these ways, but as Lerner summarizes The 
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Economics of Control (20, p. 1), 
"The fundamental aim of socialism is not the abolition 
of private property but the extension of democracy... 
(but) this is obscured by dogmas of the right and of 
the left." 
There is little to be gained in obscuring the subject any 
longer by proceeding in a more dogmatic discussion. Maybe 
there is great gain for the society and for individuals in 
an extension of the cooperative system, maybe there is great 
loss. We can at least say that social scientists have not 
arrived at any agreement on this point, and that it is 
neither our job to further the discussion nor to take a 
position. 
The trouble is that there is not really a theory of 
cooperation. Social scientists have looked at cooperatives 
from the practical point of view, and few have ever tried 
to build up a theoretical framework which could fit most of 
the main aspects of the cooperative system, in particular 
the economic part of it. David Hamilton remarked that: 
"Cooperative theory and the cooperative movement were 
largely ignored by economic theory. With the possible 
exception of John Stuart Mill and Charles Gide 
practically every economist in the main stream ignored 
cooperation. It was likely to be dismissed as a part 
of the Utopian socialism which preceded the scientific 
socialism of Marx. It was hopelessly reformist" (15). 
There is a gap to fill. We cannot pretend to develop 
an analysis on the relative efficiency of cooperative organi­
zations without working out some theoretical framework 
describing their economic mechanism. Because, 
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"We cannot do without theory. It will always defeat 
practice in the end for a quite simple reason. 
Practice is static. It does and does well what it 
knows. It has, however, no principle for dealing 
with what it doesn't know... Practice is not well 
adapted for rapid adjustment to a changing environ­
ment. Theory is light-footed. It can adapt itself 
to changed circumstances, think out fresh combinations 
and possibilities, peer into the future" (Lyndall 
F. Urwick, 13). 
For these reasons we use throughout this study an approach 
essentially theoretical. This type of approach implies 
many abstractions from the real world, so as to reduce its 
complexities to manageable proportions (11, p. 4). The 
result is a logical model which does not leave much place 
for some very specific problems concerning particular types 
of cooperatives. However, some adjustments to the model 
could be made to deal with special situations. 
The first chapter will concern the decision-making 
process of individuals. The individual has an important 
position in cooperative as in competitive systems. His 
position results principally from the fact that he is making 
decisions. Some of the individual's decisions affect the 
individual alone, but most of them affect other individuals 
as well. The analysis of the individual decision-making 
process is very important for our purpose, since it explains 
essentially why and how cooperatives develop; it is at the 
same time a logical way to build up a game structure. 
The second chapter deals with the bargaining 
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cooperatives, i.e., the cooperatives which are mostly con­
cerned with the purchasing and with the marketing of members' 
resources and products. It presents and explains, with the 
help of a game theory framework, the process of collusion 
of individuals into coalitions. Coalition and coalition 
structures have a particular meaning in bargaining. They 
are closely related to the concept of bargaining power. 
In addition, the game theory approach to bargaining coopera­
tives is the best framework for presenting and developing 
the idea of cooperation in the most general sense. 
The third chapter deals with the resource cooperatives. 
The programming approach used in this chapter could be 
figures as an operational reformulation of the game approach. 
But what it gains in operationalism, it loses in power of 
description. Only relatively simple problems can be handled. 
This framework seems particularly best adapted to the analysis 
of the resource cooperatives where, instead of bargaining 
power aggregation, we observe resource reallocation and 
aggregation among firms. This framework permits us to go 
farther into the analysis of cooperative organization and 
efficiency. It provides a way to elaborate a best coalition 
structure of the firms in an industry. The game theory 
approach as well as the programming approach permits us to 
differentiate clearly between the two types of efficiency 
normally considered: the global efficiency and the individual 
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efficiency. 
The fourth chapter considers the firm cooperative with 
the help of a more refined approach: the classical economic 
approach. This approach is applied yet to another form of 
cooperative where the resources of the individuals as well 
as their activities are aggregated into a new and common 
unit of production. It helps to determine more precisely 
the global efficiency of cooperative relative to non-
cooperative enterprises. Furthermore, this framework permits 
us to establish some economic comparisons between alternative 
cooperative solutions. 
The fifth chapter presents a short summary and the 
general conclusions of the study. 
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INDIVIDUAL'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS; 
AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM^ 
In the economic literature the individual has a central 
and very important position. The theory of consumer behavior 
explains decisions relative to consumption patterns. The 
theory of production shows how the entrepreneur makes his 
decisions concerning the resource mix and the level of 
production. The theory of exchange puts in evidence some 
rules according to which the individual exchanges goods. 
The role of the individual is to select, among all possible 
alternatives, a strategy which maximizes his objective 
function. The importance of the individual results from 
the fact that he is making decisions. 
The decision theory explains the individual behavior in 
the decision making process. It considers the individual 
in his normal environment; in the society, among other 
individuals. And it shows why and how the individual selects 
one strategy instead of another. 
The interdependence of individuals' decision making 
processes is evidenced by the specific consideration of the 
^This approach has been mostly suggested by the very 
good introduction Dr. Arnold H. Faden used for his course 
in Economic theory. The most important contributions 
related to this approach can be found in the following works 
as noted at the end of the study; 31, 1, 5, 36, 22, 35, 16, 
23, 22, 2, 34, 28, 41; some of which will be used as direct 
references throughout the chapter. 
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possible control an individual has on the decision of another 
individual. This notion of controllability has a direct 
application in bargaining. It is the essential element 
in the building of bargaining power (defined in the 
chapter). 
The presentation in this chapter of part of the decision 
theory becomes important when we consider that cooperatives 
are voluntary coalitions of persons. The voluntary aspect 
of the cooperatives we consider gives a particular importance 
to the individual decision making process. The decision 
theory contributes to the explanation of the reasons why 
the individual selects a cooperative strategy in some of 
his economic activities. 
Axioms and Postulates 
Postulate 1; Postulate the existence of a subjective 
probability as introduced by Thomas Bayes (5) in contrast 
to the objective probability as defined in terms of relative 
frequency (23, p. 291). 
Postulate 2; Introduce a point set A of propositions A^, 
i=l,2,...,n, exactly one of them must be true, which is 
termed a prepositional range or set of behavior alternatives 
(41) . 
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Postulate 31 Individuals have a set of a priori beliefs 
over A at any time, e.g., A^>A2 if individual I believes 
that the probability A^^ will occur is higher than the 
probability A^ will occur. 
Postulate 4 ; Define f(A^) a real function defined for all 
elements A^ of A. This function can be interpreted as a 
payoff function. 
Axion 1; For any person at any time, there exists a real-
valued function "Pr" such that 0_<Pr (A^) £1, and PrfA^j^PrfAg) 
if A^>A2 (a priori belief implies a priori probability). 
Theorem 1; If A^ and A^ are incompatible (mutually ex­
clusive) , then 
Pr(A^ Ag) = Pr(A^) + PrfAg) . 
Postulate 5 ; Each individual possesses a strategy range 
S and believes that the choice of a strategy , j=l,2,...,m, 
within its range affects the distribution of A. Write 
Pr (Aj^ |Sj) to represent the probability of occurrence of A^ 
given the strategy S^ has been selected. 
Axiom 2; A^ is uncontrollable if and only if Pr(A^|Sj) 
is the same for all j. (In some sense one can measure the 
power of an individual by the number of propositions which 
are controllable by him). 
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Theorem 2t (Bayes, 5) Given E defined as a set of new 
evidence, 
Pr(E|A.) Pr(A.) 
Pr(A^|E) = —- pr{E) its simplest form) 
This suggests how a new piece of information will modify 
the previous judgments as to the uncertainty of a situation. 
Bayes relates by his theorem the a posteriori probability, 
i.e., Pr(A^|E), to the a priori probability, i.e., Pr(A^), 
in a functional manner. 
To clarify what we mean by a priori and a posteriori 
probabilities, we cite Arrow (1); 
"In a given context, the a priori probabilities are 
the judgments of the relative uncertainty of various 
hypotheses made on the basis of all past information; 
the a posteriori probabilities, the judgments made 
with the aid of new information." 
At this point, we introduce the set of axioms given 
by von Newmann and Morgenstern on the choice among probability 
distributions : 
Axiom 3; Preordering axiom. There is a complete preordering 
in the probability distribution by each individual. For 
each individual, whether Pr (A^)>Pr (Aj^) , or Pr (A^XPr (Aj^) , 
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or Pr(A^)^fr(A^),^ for all a, b, members of the index 
set {i}. 
Axiom 4; Archimedean axiom. Suppose PrfA^lyPrCAglXPrfAg), 
then there is a scalar number r, 0<r£l, such that r Pr(A^) 
+ (1-r) PrfAgl^PrCAg). 
Axiom 5: Strong independence axiom. Suppose PrfA^X^PrtAg), 
then there is a scalar number r, O^r^l, such that 
r PrCA^) + (1-r) PrCA^i^r PrfAg) + (1-r) Pr(A3). 
This is to be true for all Pr(A^) and for all r. 
Theorem. 3; If an individual's preferences satisfy; 
(1) The preordering axiom, 
(2) The Archimedean axiom, 
(3) The strong independence axiom, 
then there exists a random variable U such that, Pr'^Pr", 
if and only if E(U)'>E(U)". (A proof of this theorem can 
be found in (23, p. 261)). 
It is easy to show from Theorem 3 that the utility 
^Pr (A, )>'Pr (A^) means that Pr(A, ) is strictly preferred 
to Pr(Ag) By the individual. 
Pr(A,XPr(A.) means that Pr(A_) is not preferred to 
Pr(A^). 12 2. 
Pr (A, )'V'Pr (A~) means that Pr (A, ) and Pr(A_) are in­
different to the individual. 
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function so defined is determined up to a monotonie trans­
formation. 
Postulate 6 : The primary objective of all individuals is 
to maximize their own utility. 
Constructing a Game Structure 
We follow the approach of Savage (35) to move from the 
preceding axioms and postulates towards a game structure. 
To any prepositional range {A^} we can associate, for 
each individual, a utility vector which describes his 
preference relation among all propositions assumed non­
randomized. This result can be derived directly from 
Theorem 3. Nevertheless, even if individual I can associate 
a utility vector with his prepositional range, he often 
cannot choose any proposition directly from this range. 
The process of decision making consists of the choice of 
a strategy Sj from the strategy set S (as postulate 5 
describes). This choice is often related to the outcome 
for the individual by a set of probability distributions P 
with members The relation between strategies and 
outcomes in utility is described by the following table: 
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Table 1. Propositions related to the decisions by a set of 
probability distributions 
(Utility set) 
"l "2 "i "n 
^1 ^2 ^i 
Si Pll Pl2 Pli Pin 
=2 
^21 P22 P2i P2n 
(Decision 
set) 
Pjl  Pj2 Pj i  Pjn 
Sm Pml Pm2 Pmi Pmn 
The process of decision making is equivalent to picking 
a probability distribution, and Pr(A^|Sj) = Pj^. The best 
strategy Sj the individual can choose is the one which 
maximizes the expected value of his utility, 
n n 
i.e., max Z U(A.) Pr(A.|S.) = max Z U. P.. . 
j i=l 1 ^ : i i=l 1 
This, for example, describes a game of an individual against 
nature. In the following development, individuals will 
not only be confronted with nature, but they will also have 
to take account cf each others' strategy moves. For this 
purpose, assume that the prepositional range A is the strict 
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domain of propositions to individual I, and introduce a new 
prepositional range B of propositions B^y k=l,2,...,p, to 
the individual II. Corresponding to his range of proposi­
tions, individual II associates a set of utility numbers 
in the same way as individual I. He possesses a strategy 
set related to utilities by a set of probability distri­
butions as described before. 
The probability of individual I obtaining will now 
be affected by the likelihood individual II has to get Bj^, 
i.e., we assume a certain interdependence between the 
probability distributions for individual I and the prob­
ability distributions for individual II. Different levels 
of interdependence will be discussed, i.e., one which 
affects only the set of probability distributions of indi­
vidual I and one which affects both sets of probability 
distributions simultaneously. 
In both cases individual I is faced with the choice of 
a strategy . He selects that strategy which maximizes 
his expected utility over all possible strategies. But now 
this process is affected by individual II, and this maxi­
mization of utility ip conditioned by the range B of indi­
vidual II as well. 
Case one 
The range of propositions for individual II is con­
trollable by individual I (see axiom 2), i.e.. 
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individual can affect the probability of occurrence of any 
Bj^ by decisions over his own strategy set S, and simul­
taneously the range A of propositions for individual I is 
controllable by individual II. 
Pr(A. |S.) = Z Pr(A. |B. S.) Pr(B, Is.), 
i j  ^  J  ^  J  
and the choice of S^ is derived from: 
max Z Z U(A.) Pr(A,|a. S.) Pr(B, |S.), 
j k i ^ 1 K 3 ^ ] 
where Z U(A.) Pr(A.|B, S. ) = Urepresents the expected 
^ 1 1 jC J JK 
utility for individual I, given has been realized by II. 
Case two 
The range B of propositions for individual II is un­
controllable by individual I, i.e., I cannot affect the 
probability of occurrence of B^ by his own decision over 
his own strategy set S, but the range A for I is still 
controllable by II. 
Pr(A.|S.) = Z Pr(A.|B. S.) Pr(B.) 
1 J 1 K J 
and the choice of Sj is obtained from 
max Z Z U(A. ) Pr (A. IB, S.) Pr(B.), 
j k i ^ 1 D K 
from which we could still get the U.. as defined before, and 
rewrite the preceding statement in the simplified way: 
21 
max Z UPr (B, ) . 
i k * 
This simple transformation permits us to represent 
what is going on in two-dimensional space (see Table 2) . 
Table 2. Choice of the optimal strategy for I, given a ^ 
probability distribution over the range B for II 
^2 ^k 
®1 ®2 ®P 
Si 
"ll "l2 "ik "IP 
^2 "21 "22 "2k "2P 
"j2 "jP 
Sm 
"ml "m2 "mk "mp 
^P^ = Pr(Bj^) represents the probability that will be 
realized by II. 
Table 2 represents part of a normal form of a two-
person-game with chance move; the complete normal form 
could be represented in the three-dimensional space. The 
game as described in Table 2 reduces the decision of indi­
vidual II to the probability distribution P^, k=l,2,...,p. 
But in fact II possesses as many probability distributions 
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as strategies. He chooses his best strategy dependently 
or independently of I (according to case 1 or 2 discussed 
above), while individual I chooses his strategy out of his 
own strategy set. 
The payoff to individual I is the Uj^: the expected 
utility given I chooses S., and B, occurs for II. The payoff ] ^ 
to individual II is not given here so as to simplify the 
notation. Since we are concerned with a general game, the 
payoff for II is not restricted to -U.. as would be the ] K 
case in a zero-sum game. We can derive the same relation­
ships for individual II. 
A Welfare Development 
In welfare economics, preference is often differentiated 
into ultimate preferences, characterized by the independence 
of the preference pattern (or map) to a change in the in­
formation set of the individual, and instrumental preferences, 
which are sensitive to changes in information. 
An information set is defined as "the schedule that 
tells, for each state of the environment, what the firm 
(individual) will know about it" (24). 
It seems reasonable to assume that individual I has an 
ultimate preference among the Aj^. This was suggested above 
by the association of a utility value with each Aj^. This is 
also true for individual II over his prepositional range B. 
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Further assume that I is not indifferent to the states of 
nature and to the strategy II will use, but that he has 
only an instrumental preference over these sets. This 
assumption appears reasonable since the random effects of 
nature on the set A given any strategy S^, and the strategy 
used by II both affect the payoff of individual I in­
directly. 
An intuitive generalization of this to an n-individual 
situation can be obtained. We may assume that in the process 
of decision making, I is confronted not only by one other 
individual but by a set of individuals, each choosing from 
a set of strategies not all indifferent to I. 
The existence of an external effect with its importance 
depending upon the indirect consequences of the strategy 
of any individual on the payoff function of any other indi­
vidual, justifies a deeper study of the process of decision 
making related to the notion of controllability. 
Controllability and Decision Process 
Whenever individual I has partial control over the range 
of propositions B of individual II, the exchange of infor­
mation before the simultaneous process of making decisions 
may influence the choice of the strategy to be used by II. 
This permits II to adjust his behavior to the external 
interaction of I on the possible outcome of the game. In 
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other words, the controllability of an individual over the 
prepositional range of the other individuals, when exchange 
of information is possible, leads to a controllability of 
the same order over their strategy ranges. In more general 
terminology, we would say, that I controls II if I has a 
perfect controllability over the prepositional range of II 
(and so indirectly over his strategy range), and if the 
reverse is not true. This could describe the class of 
relations between master, I and slave, II. 
Perfect controllability, if it ever existed, does not 
exist any more. We are going to be concerned with mostly 
partial controllability in one direction, and very often 
by mixed controllability (controllability in both direc­
tions) . 
This influence of an individual's strategy over another 
individual's decision making, used to improve the payoff 
of the former, is usually described by the ambiguous concepts 
of bargaining and bargaining power. 
According to Fellner (10, p. 15), 
"The situation in which the behavior of all parties 
concerned depends on the assumed reactions of the other 
parties is typically that leading to 'bargaining'. 
In all cases in which bargaining takes place we are 
faced with conjectural interdependence. Bargaining 
in the usual sense presupposes conjectural inter­
dependence, but bargaining in the usual sense does 
not take place in all cases in which conjectural 
interdependence exists. Bargaining in the usual sense 
requires direct contact and negotiations between 
the parties concerned, in addition to conjectural 
interdependence." 
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In our notation, we translate conjectural inter­
dependence into the notion of controllability. We made it 
clear, as Fellner does, that controllability is not suffi­
cient to influence the decision of the "other parties". It 
may only affect their payoffs if exchange of information 
between parties does not occur before the simultaneous 
decision making. 
The bargaining relationship could be decomposed in two 
important elements as proposed by Hallberg (14, p. 10-11): 
"A conflict of interest between the different parties 
to the bargain, (and) an attempt by each to resolve 
the conflict as favorably as possible to himself." 
Since a conflict of interest is postulated by the con­
trollability of one person on the other's payoff and vice 
versa. 
"Bargaining may be viewed simply as the simultaneous 
effort by each party to the bargain to win the con­
sent of the other(s)" (14, p. 11). 
At this point, let us discuss the concept of bargaining 
power. As already indicated in Axiom 2, the power of an 
individual can be measured by the number of propositions 
which are controllable by him. His bargaining power is 
composed of this power and of the ability he has to make 
it known to the other parties in an effort to influence 
their choices of strategies to his advantage. 
The possession of bargaining power does not directly 
determine the outcome of the game. The object is to use it 
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in the way so as to maximize one's objectives. The possible 
tactics or bargaining strategy to be used conditions 
greatly the eventual outcome. Stevens (42, p. 57-96) out­
lines the elements of one's bargaining strategy as follows:^ 
"A. Information giving and seeking tactics 
1. representing one's own preferences— the 
satisfactions one associates with various 
outcomes of the negotiations, 
2. attempts to discover the opponent's preferences, 
B. Persuasion 
1. attempts to alter the opponent's preferences, 
2. attempts to alter or establish the opponent's 
expectations about one's own negotiation or 
extra-negotiation environment, 
C. Coercion 
1. attempts to alter or establish the opponent's 
expectations about one's intended course of 
action including one's accurate representa­
tion, misrepresentation, and/or concealing 
of his own preferences, 
2. attempts to alter or establish the preferences 
and courses of action of "third parties" where 
these may affect the outcome of the nego­
tiations. " 
A close study of the components of a bargaining strategy 
reveals the nature of the game which is implicitly considered. 
This game is somewhat structured like a zero-sum game 
(strictly competitive game as called by Luce and Raiffa 
(22). One party cannot gain anything without making the 
^As related in Hallberg (14, p. 15-16). 
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others lose something. This is made explicit by the ex­
pression of "opponents" used by Stevens. 
It is clear that the zero-sum game, or anything close 
to it, is not relevant in many economic situations of the 
real world. Non-zero-sum games where both parties can gain 
simultaneously by choosing appropriate strategies are 
common. For that reason we propose as the opposite to bar­
gaining strategy, which has much in common with what we 
call competitive strategy, the cooperative strategy. 
Like the competitive strategy described above as the 
bargaining strategy, the cooperative strategy obtains its 
value in the existence of some sort of controllability by 
one party on another party, and of an information rule which 
applies to both sides. The existence of an external effect 
action, defined as controllability, is as much necessary 
for competitive strategy as for cooperative strategy. There 
is no competition if the action of one individual cannot 
affect the welfare of another, there is not even an 
economy. In the same line, there cannot be cooperation, in 
the common sense of the word, if whatever one party does, 
the other is indifferent to it. 
The cooperative strategy subdivides into different 
components or tactics which could be summarized by: 
(1) open communication; 
(2) joint maximization; 
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(3) collusion; 
(4) side payment. 
Collusion means some mutual adjustment in the decision 
process of both parties for their common benefit. A joint 
maximization, which is a formal way to describe some partial 
collusion process, often is undertaken with the understanding 
that a side payment is to be made to compensate the 
opportunity cost borne by one of the parties engaged. Open 
communication is the information rule without which there 
is no true cooperation. Since a cooperative strategy 
presumes the existence of a mutual adjustment of the decisions 
for a common benefit, the information rule is essential, and 
its quality determines to a large extent the success of 
the operation. 
Conclusion 
The axiomatic approach to the decision making process 
defines essentially the economic rationality of the indi­
vidual. The individual has an imperfect knowledge of the 
real world. He has a certain feeling (modified by subsequent 
experiments) about the relation between the decision he 
makes and the payoff he obtains. His knowledge combined with 
his preference pattern over the possible outcomes determines 
his choice of a specific decision. In the process of 
decision making the objective of the individual is to 
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maximize his utility. The individual's utility is con­
sidered in this chapter as a function of the individual's 
payoff. No consideration about a possible dependence be­
tween an individual's utility and another individual's 
welfare has been developed. It is in the Hobbes tradition 
to consider that this dependence between individuals is 
negligible. Our desire to avoid introducing ethical con­
siderations in the explanation of the development of 
cooperative organizations leads us to adopt implicitly 
the Hobbes idea of human nature. We are bound to explain 
now how the cooperative forms by only objective considera­
tions . 
The notion of interdependence of individuals described 
in this chapter through a game structure gives us a way to 
explain the development of cooperative organizations inde­
pendently of any ethical argument about the cooperative-
ness of human nature. The controllability of individuals 
on the welfare of each other, which determines the more 
specific controllability of individuals on each others' 
decision sets, obliges the individuals to select among two 
different attitudes relative to society: the competitive 
attitude and the cooperative attitude. The competitive 
attitude of an individual relative to other individuals is 
characterized by the use of individual bargaining power. 
The individual selects an offensive-defensive type of 
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strategy, considering the other individual's aims as 
essentially antagonistic to his own aims. He makes use 
of the controllability he has over the decision set of other 
individuals in such a way as to maximize his utility. 
The cooperative attitude results essentially from the 
recognition by a group of individuals that, at least for 
some of their activities, their objectives are not antago­
nistic. They may, for example, bargain individually with a 
common more powerful individual with antagonistic aims to 
them. The idea that the association of their efforts in 
the bargaining process may improve the outcome of each of 
them may start the coalition process and then the cooperative. 
The analysis of the collusion of individuals into coali­
tions will be developed in the following chapter. The game 
structure we obtained in the study of the individual decision 
process makes it easier to relate the decision theory and 
the game theory approach of the individual coalition process. 
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BARGAINING COOPERATIVE: A GAME THEORY APPROACH 
The objective of this chapter is to show why and how 
individuals group into coalitions. This is an attempt to 
explain the most important step in the creation of a 
cooperative: the individual's decision to associate with 
other individuals to realize collectively some common 
objectives. 
The selection of bargaining activity to study the process 
of collusion of individuals into coalitions is motivated by 
the fact that this activity alone explains most of the 
existing coalitions, and that it has been already related to 
the individual decision process. 
Before delving into the theory, it is necessary to explain 
what we mean by bargaining cooperatives and what makes this 
subject so important in the present world economy. Bargaining 
cooperatives are institutions guided by cooperative strategies 
in bargaining problems. More precisely, they represent 
the development and exploitation of the bargaining power of 
individuals organized in coalitions. When we speak about 
cooperation, individual bargaining power is still of con­
cern, but to a lesser degree. Individual bargaining power 
transforms, according to the degree of cooperation among 
individuals (degree of collusion), into group bargaining 
power or coalition bargaining power. 
Bargaining cooperatives were probably the first kind of 
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cooperatives to come into existence after the phalansteries. 
The reason for their rapid development is similar to the 
motivation for any kind of concentration and integration in 
industry and trade sectors. Concentration in markets brings 
some economic advantages, derived largely from price-
bargaining power. Concentrations often lead to oligopolistic 
or sometimes monopolistic situations characterized by the 
power to determine or set a price level consistent with the 
objectives of profit maximization, market share, etc... 
Initially, concentration in the industry was the only 
way to improve the bargaining power of the firm (individual); 
this was used long before the idea of cooperation emerged. 
Cooperatives, especially bargaining cooperatives, appeared 
in the last century as a reaction to this concentration. 
Concentrations affected the competitive structure of the 
markets for some products with differential impacts on the 
participants in the markets. The initially powerless people 
found a way to reorganize the market in a manner more closely 
approximating the former distribution of power by creating 
consumer buying groups, thereby pooling their bargaining 
power to balance the effect of industrial concentrations. 
The best examples of cooperative organizations are 
always found in agriculture. The competitive nature of 
agriculture has often created difficulties in marketing and 
in producers receiving a "fair price". Other industries. 
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especially those selling to or buying from farmers, have 
taken advantage of their relative concentration and organi­
zation. Grain and milk marketing cooperatives are examples 
of attempts by farmers to improve their income by increasing 
their bargaining power. Today there are very few countries 
in which the agricultural sector does not have cooperatives 
ready to counterbalance industrial concentration in the non-
agricultural sectors. Some cooperatives achieved even more 
than a mere balance between bargaining power of agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors. For example, the cooperative 
of citrus growers in California were able to integrate 
their activities of processing and marketing their production 
into a monopolistic type of market organization. 
The game theory approach to the study of bargaining 
cooperatives is particularly appropriate to the objective 
of this chapter. Game theory is the best tool to build a 
good heuristic approach to cooperation. Furthermore, game 
theory provides a complete and very interesting approach to 
the problem of collusion of individuals into coalitions. 
Although it is not our primary aim in this chapter, 
the game approach will help us to develop some notion of 
efficiency at the individual and at the coalition levels. 
This is not surprising since the decision of a rational 
individual (as presented in the first chapter) to group 
with other individuals cannot be independent of efficiency 
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considerations. 
We start this chapter with some theoretical considera­
tions about nonbargaining games and noncooperative games to 
make clear the changes that bargaining and subsequently 
cooperation bring to the individual's outcomes. The 
theoretical analysis of cooperative bargaining games is more 




A game is not easy to define in a few words. What 
we mean by a game could be characterized by three elements: 
(1) A strategy set from which the individual picks his 
strategy. 
(2) A certain level of knowledge by the individual 
about the factors affecting the game, e.g., what Owen (29, 
p. 2) calls "c. possible lack of knowledge", which is some­
times characterized by the existence of "information sets". 
(3) A payoff function relating the pure strategy 
used to some payoffs or outcomes of the game. In the case 
where the opponent acts randomly, i.e., in case of games 
where nature plays a role (existence of uncertainty), the 
payoff function is expressed as the expected values of the 
outcomes using some known subjective probability distri­
butions . 
35 
As indicated in the preceding chapter, the individual's 
choice of a strategy in a game is a function of his pre­
ference for the expected payoffs and of his knowledge of 
the game itself. 
A nonbargaining game is a game where bargaining con­
siderations have no place, either because the use of a 
bargaining strategy as defined in the preceding chapter 
could not improve the expected payoffs or because preplay 
exchanges of information between players are forbidden or 
even impossible. The classes of games where bargaining 
strategies are of no advantage include zero-sum games, more 
generally denoted "strictly competitive games" (22). 
Zero-sum games 
We are going to devote some time to zero-sum games, 
keeping in mind that they are not the only class of games 
where the outcome is not affected by any kind of bargaining 
strategy. As a matter of fact, some non-zero-sum games 
where any move benefiting one player is in some way an 
expense to the other, i.e., competitive games, do not allow 
an advantageous introduction of bargaining strategies, e.g., 
constant-sum-games. 
Equilibrium in zero-sum games 
The zero-sum games represent closed systems; everything 
that someone wins must be lost by someone else (29, p. 12). 
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In the two-person zero-sum games, if we call A the payoff 
matrix for individual I, the payoff matrix for II is -A. 
It has been proved that all zero-sum games have at least 
a mixed strategy equilibrium point, where a mixed strategy 
is interpreted as "a probability distribution on the set of 
the player pure strategies" (29, p. 16). In the two-person 
case, the equilibrium point of the game, where player I 
chooses one strategy x from his strategy set X, and II, y 
from Y, the payoff function being represented as F(x,y) 
corresponds to the value of the game satisfying: (th~ zx 
theorem proved by von Neumann and Morgenstern) 
max min F(x,y) = min max F(x,y), 
xeX yeY yeY xeX 
which defines a saddle point. In a strictly competitive 
game, which could be extended to n-person generalizations 
with some loss of simplicity in exposition, the player cannot 
expect an outcome better than the one defined by the minimax 
theorem. 
Noncooperative Nonzero-sum Games 
Observations on economic phenomena suggest that a zero-
sum game is a rare exception in real economic life. It 
primarily concerns the activities ordinarily described as 
parlor games and common bets. To approach reality in an 
economy of exchange, as we observe in everyday life, we need 
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to introduce a more general class of games known as non­
zero-sum games. 
Definition of nonzero-sum games 
The notion of a game is not affected; only the outcome 
or payoff consideration has to be extended. The payoff 
matrix or normal form of the game becomes a payoff bimatrix 
for a two-person game and payoff multimatrix for a multi-
person, say, n-person game. To go from the simple to the 
more complicated, we will at first consider two-person 
games in some detail and then extend the results to n-
person games. 
"In general, a finite two-person, general-sum game can 
be expressed as a pair of mxn matrices, A = (a^j) and 
B = (b^j), or equivalently, as an mxn matrix (A,B) 
each of whose entries is an ordered pair (a^j,b^j). 
The entries a^^ and b^j are the payoffs (in utilities) 
to the players I and II respectively, assuming they 
choose, respectively, their ith and jth pure strategies" 
(Owen, 29, p. 136). 
Here we will only consider the non-cooperative case in 
which any type of collusion is forbidden. Thus, we 
abstract from correlated strategies and side payments to 
concentrate on the choice of strategies resulting from the 
preferences of the individual relative to his payoff matrix, 
his knowledge of the game, and his power of controllability 
which makes the players of the game to some extent inter­
dependent. All are conscious of what the others can do to 
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improve or reduce their expected utility, but the players' 
objective is the maximization of their own expected out­
come. In other words, this class of non-cooperative games 
could be described as competitive games in the most general 
sense. 
Equilibrium in nonzero-sum games 
The notion of equilibrium for a bimatrix game (A,B) is 
a generalization of the one described for the zero-sum 
game. No saddle point can be described here except in rare 
exceptions where some part of the game has zero-sum 
properties. Owen (29, p. 137) gives this definition of 
equilibrium in a two-person, general-sum game; 
"A pair of mixed strategies (x+, y"^) for the bimatrix 
game (A,B) is said to be in equilibrium if, for any 
other mixed strategies, x and y, 
X A y"*" £ x"*" A y"^  
x^ B y ^  x+ B y+ ." 
Nash has shown that: 
"...Every non-cooperative game with finite set of pure 
strategies has at least one mixed strategy equilibrium 
pair" (22, p. 106). 
A proof of this theorem can be found in Owen (29, p. 137), 
who derives it from the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem. 
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An example showing the relativity of the concept of equilibrium 
in nonzero-sum games; "Battle of the Sexes" 
An unrealistic economic example will illustrate the 
relativity of the concept of equilibrium for a bimatrix 
gcime. We take this example from Luce and Raiffa (22, p. 
90) who call it "Battle of the Sexes". Consider the bimatrix 
game in its normal form: 
Yl Yg 
(2, 1) (-1, -1) 
*2 (—If -1) (If 2) 
(x^, y^^) and (Xgf yg) are both equilibrium pairs, but indi­
vidual I prefers the first to the second and II, the second 
to the first. A pair of mixed strategies 
3 2 2 3 [ (-g- x^ , ^  *2'' ^5" ^1' 5 ^2^^ is also an equilibrium pair with 
a payoff (^, . A geometric representation of the possible 
payoffs in Figure 1 will show the complexity of the bimatrix 
noncooperative game with which we are dealing. 
Apparently the bargaining powers of both players are equiva­
lent. Nevertheless, 
"If player I announces that he plans to choose x, and 
that no arguments will alter his choice, and if II 
has faith in I's stubbornness in sticking to his 
announced intentions, then she (II) has no alternative 
but to choose y,. A similar argument holds if II 
announces her intentions first." 
40 
(1,2) Player II's 
utility 
(2,1) 
Player l's utility 
(-1,-1) 
Figure 1. Geometric representation of the possible payoffs 
in the "Battle of the Sexes" (22, p. 93) 
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Cooperative and noncooperative games 
For Luce and Raiffa, preplay communications already 
characterize a cooperative game (22, p. 89). We feel that 
a non-cooperative bargaining game where preplay communications 
are forbidden is difficult to imagine. We will therefore 
stick to the definition provided by Owen and accept as non-
cooperative games all games where there is neither mutual 
synchronization of decisions nor side payments. In more 
general terms, we describe as non-cooperative bargaining 
games all the bargaining operations which respect most of 
the criteria common to the normal economic market where 
everybody seeks his own direct benefit independently of 
others, using fully his own bargaining power. Preplay 
negotiations take place. But they only concern the exchange 
of information about the controllability of the individual 
over the opponent strategy sets. It is part of the bargaining 
approach. 
Noncooperative Bargaining Game : Axiomatic Approach 
In this section we are interested in a formalization 
which could be used to derive an equilibrium set or an 
equilibrium point from a classical bargaining problem in 
which two individuals confront each other. The axiomatic 
approach we employ has been used in welfare economics. 
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Assumptions 
(1) For simplicity, assume two individuals I and II, 
each exclusively possessing one final good M and N, 
respectively, in finite quantities. 
(2) Individuals can exchange part of the good they 
possess for part of the other good if they can agree on 
the terms of trade. 
(3) To any mixture (possible linear combination) of 
goods, called a bundle of goods, an individual could get 
through trading, he attaches a utility value (as outlined 
in the preceding chapter). 
(4) The only objective of each individual is the maxi­
mization of his own utility. 
(5) Diminishing marginal utility results from increasing 
consumption of one good; this leads to the notion of a 
diminishing marginal rate of substitution among goods. 
(6) Individuals are not satiated. This simply means 
that there is no negative marginal utility attached to any 
level of consumption. The more an individual can get of 
one good the other being held fixed, the better off he is. 
Illustration of the bargaining game 
These assumptions will implicitly sustain the shape 
of the curves and sets that are going to be subsequently 
drawn. The Edgeworth box diagram in Figure 2 illustrates 
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the indifference curves attached to any mixture of M and 
N for both individuals. The exchange set, R, is convex 
(assumption 5) and bounded by the iso utility curves of the 
two individuals, I on the left, II on the right. Any 
point in this set describes a possible trade decision between 
I and II and each point defines two bundles of goods. 
Before any trade occurs, the individuals are at point C, 
which belongs to R, and each derives utility u+ and v"*" 
respectively. A mapping in two dimensional utility space 
of all the points in R gives the set R' as shown in Figure 
3. R' is also a convex and bounded set. It indicates the 
respective outcomes of any trade between I and II, including 
the no trade point C. R' contains an infinite number of 
points directly related to an infinite number of possible 
combined strategies for both individuals. A normal form of 
the present game exists but since it has an infinite number 
of entries, we prefer its continuous representation (R-»-R') 
which we call S. 
From the maximin value to the "negotiation set" 
The minimum acceptable amount of utility individual I 
can obtain by unilateral action, regardless of what II 
does (in other words, the maximin value of the game) is u"*"; 











Individual I's utility: u 
Figure 3. The utility set R' 
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+ 
u = max min x A y 
X y 
+ . _ V = max min x B y 
y X 
using the notation defined in the beginning of this chapter; 
(u+, v+) is represented by the point C in Figure 3. Using 
Owen's terminology (29, p. 141) we are now looking for a 
rule which will assign to such a triple (S, u"*", v"*") a 
"bargaining solution": 
F(S, u"*", v+) = (u, v) . 
The problem is to define such a function, F. 
Our first step will be to go from the maximin values to 
the "negotiation set" as defined by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, using the following three axioms from John Nash 
(23, p. 141). 
Axiom 1 : Individual rationality. (u, v)^(u^, v"*") . (The 
assumptions 4 and 6 sustain it). 
Axiom 2: Feasibility. (u, v)eS (or, for the representation 
in Figure 3 (u, v) belongs to R'). 
Axiom 3; Pareto optimality. If (u, v)eS, and (u, v)^(u, v), 
then (u, v) = (u, v). 
There are an infinite number of pairs (u, v) which 
satisfy the three axioms, namely, all the pairs (u,v) on 
the curved line from a to b in Figure 3. This defines the 
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"negotiation set" from which we propose, primarily using 
Nash's approach, to select one single point (u, v) as a 
solution to the noncooperative bargaining problem. 
From the "negotiation set" to the noncooperative bargaining 
equilibrium 
To fulfill that purpose we need three more axioms, the 
application of which will restrict the set of optimal solu­
tions to a single point. These axioms are also those of 
John Nash (29, p. 141). 
Axiom 4; Independence of irrelevant alternatives. If 
(Û, v)eTcS, and (u, v) = F(S, u"*", v+), then (u, v) = 
F(T, u"*", v"*") i.e., any reduction of the feasible set, so 
far as it does not affect the optimal point previously 
selected, does not affect the solution. 
Axiom 5: Independence of linear transformations. Let T 
be obtained from S by the linear transformations, 
u* = d^ u + e^ 
v' = dg V + eg (where d^, d^, e^, e^ are scalars). 
Then, if F(S, u"*", v+) = (u, v) , we must have, 
F(T, d^ u"*" + e^, dg v"*" + eg) = (d^ û + e^, dg v + e^) . 
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Axiom 6; (Symmetry). Suppose S is such that 
(u, v)eS +-*- (v, u)eS 
Suppose also that u"*" = v"*", and F(S, u"*", v"*") = (u, v) . Then 
Û = V. 
Axiom 4 has been criticized in other contexts, mostly 
as an argument against the "Possibility Theorem" of Arrow. 
We consider it acceptable here as a result of the con­
sistency implicitly attributed to individuals as discussed in 
the preceding chapter. Axiom 5 "is natural enough if we 
assume that any utility function is as good as any other" 
(29, p. 141). Theorem 3 of the preceding chapter implies 
this. 
We now discuss the validity of Axiom 6. It is by far 
the most restrictive in the behavioral sense. Neverthe­
less Axiom 6 is 
"...quite acceptable if the bargaining is between two 
equal entities; it may not be so acceptable if the 
bargaining is between unequal entities, e.g., between 
one person and an entire community" (29, p. 141, 142). 
Theorem 1: "There is a unique function, F, defined on all 
bargaining problems (S, x+, y"*") satisfying Axioms 1 to 6" 
(29, p. 142). 
By using the following lemma and the compactness of S, 
(S is closed and bounded), Owen shows specifically how the 
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unique solution is obtained. 
Lemma 1: "If there are any points (u, v)eS such that u>u+, 
v>v^, then there is a unique point (u, v) which maximizes 
the function 
4* 4* g(u, v) = (u - u )(v - V ) 
over that subset of S for which u>u+ " (Owen, 29, p. 142). 
Owen shows that this function, g, satisfies Axioms 1 to 
6 and is a unique function. 
Graphically, the function g represents a simple mapping 
of all the points of R' in Figure 3, characterized by the 
displacement of the axes. The point, C, with coordinates 
(u+, v"*") becomes the origin (0, 0) as shown in Figure 4. 
"The slope of the boundary of S (or R'), at any 
point, represents the rate at which utility can be 
transferred from one player to the other. What Nash's 
scheme tells us, in brief, is that additional utility 
must be divided between the two players in a ratio 
equal to the rate at which this utility can be trans­
ferred. Naturally, since utility is not assumed to 
be linearly transferable, there may be only one point 
at which utility is transferable at this given rate" 
(Owen, 29, p. 145) . 
The example Owen gives as an illustration of Nash's 
scheme involves the separation of one hundred dollars be­
tween two individuals, one rich, I, and one poor, II. They 
must decide among themselves how to divide the money. The 
utility of a sum of money to an individual is assumed to be 
proportional to the logarithm of its amount. Nash's solution 
to this game gives the advantage to the richer of the two 
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V* 
(u,v)'= max g(u,v) 
(u+,v+)' b 
Figure 4. The utility set R" = g(R') 
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individuals. He gets more than half of the money to be 
distributed. This result, obvious in the computation of 
max g(u, v), has the following practical interpretation; 
"... player II*s utility for money decreases rapidly, 
while I*s does not. The result is that II will be 
very eager to get at least something, and can be 
'bargained down' by I" (29, p. 147). 
This describes well the nature of any competitive solution 
to bargaining problems when threats are not taken into 
account. 
The introduction of threats in the players' strategies 
The introduction of threats in the players' strategies 
can paradoxically modify the outcomes of games. Nash has 
shown that, 
"Any bimatrix game has at least one equilibrium pair 
of threat strategies (x, y)" (29, p. 150). 
Essentially, the only major change after introducing 
threats in the game is a displacement of the origin of the 
set R" to the point described by the threat. The solution 
is affected but not the method of obtaining the solution. 
Cooperative Bargaining Games 
Since we are going to discuss cooperative games, we 
should explicitly assume that: (Luce and Raiffa, 22, p. 114) 
"i. All preplay messages formulated by one player 
are transmitted without distortion to the other 
player(s). 
ii. All agreements are binding, and they are enforce­
able by the rules of the game. 
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iii. A player's evaluations of the outcomes of the 
game are not disturbed by these preplay negoti­
ations . " 
Two-person case 
We first return to a game discussed earlier, namely, 
the "Battle of the Sexes" as represented graphically by 
Luce and Raiffa (22, p. 93). Synchronization of decisions 
and side payments are now permitted. It is obvious, that 
in this new situation, players I and II will not risk getting 
less than an optimum outcome. The feasible set R of Figure 1 
now becomes R^ in Figure 5. Any mixture (linear combination) 
of (1, 2) and (2, 1), and more generally, any mixture of any 
point of R, now becomes a feasible outcome. 
The "negotiation set" includes all the boundary points 
from (1, 2) to (2, 1). Since individuals cooperate while 
still remaining more concerned about their own welfare 
than about the welfare of others, as the axiomatic approach 
of the preceding chapter implicitly suggests, Nash's 
bargaining process of selection of a unique solution within 
the "negotiation set" remains valid. As a matter of fact, 
there is no reason to reject any of the six axioms of the 
preceding section as formulated by Nash. 
Because of the convexity of the new set R^, any further 
attempt of the two individuals to cooperate would lead very 
likely to no other solution than the one resulting from 
normal bargaining. No matter how the players want to 
'^"tj 
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cooperate, since their mutual interests are antagonistic 
(convexity of the set S), they are bound to compete and to 
bargain as if no cooperative assumption ever existed. 
This would not be the case in an n-person case where 
coalitions could be formed. In such situations. Axiom 6 
dealing with the relative symmetry of players' strategies 
and outcomes would not be acceptable. 
The use of a cooperative strategy by both players in 
the bargaining game, i.e., the "Battle of the Sexes", en­
larges the set of feasible outcomes. The "negotiation set" 
was, in the noncooperative case, composed of two points 
figuring the outcomes (1, 2) and (2, 1). In the cooperative 
case, the "negotiation set" includes all the points on the 
line (segment (1, 2) to (2, 1), i.e., all the linear combina­
tions of the outcomes of the former negotiation set. Both 
individuals, by synchronizing their decisions, are able to 
take advantage of a convex "negotiation set" which gives 
them a wider range of feasible alternatives. 
N-person case; theoretical approach to the coalition process 
Theoretically, non-cooperative games are not affected much 
by the number of players. It may be proved that; 
"Any finite n-person, non-cooperative game has at 
least one equilibrium n-tuple of mixed strategies" 
(Owen, 29, p. 155). 
Cooperative games, however, are greatly modified by the intro­
duction of a new concept adjoined to the increased number of 
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players, i.e., the concept of coalition. 
Luce and Raiffa (22, p. 165) approach the subject from 
a very broad consideration about the possible extent and 
complexities of a cooperative game. 
"We shall cite three different approaches to the 
problem of restricted collusion. 
First, there is the one extreme in which any 
collusion logically possible is allowed to occur. 
This is characteristic of the von Neumann and 
Morgenstern theory of solution, ... In their theory 
such freedom to cooperate leads to vast numbers of 
'solutions' with no criteria to select among them. 
Second, there is the other extreme which pro­
hibits any collusion at all. .. Nash (1961), holds 
that non-cooperative games are theoretically basic and 
that cooperative gêunes can and should be subsumed 
under that theory by making communicationand bargaining 
formal moves in a non-cooperative extensive game. The 
resulting normalized game would simply enlarge the 
domain of the various strategies, 
... But McKinsey (25, p. 359) has pointed out, 
'it is extremely difficult in practice to introduce 
into the cooperative games the moves corresponding to 
negotiations in a way which will reflect all the in­
finite variety permissible in the cooperative game, 
and to do this without giving one player an arti­
ficial advantage (because of his having the first 
chance to make an offer, let us say)'. 
The third tack attempts to characterize, in what 
is surely an oversimplified manner, some types of 
restrictions on collusion. 
... the collusion among the players results in 
non-overlapping coalitions within which there is per­
fect cooperation and among which there is ruthless 
competition. Such a partition of the players into 
coalitions will be termed a coalition structure" 
(22, p. 165). 
In the case of the two-person game, we agree with Nash 
saying that "non-cooperative games are theoretically basic" 
and that from it we can extract the cooperative solution. 
But to speak about the n-person games, we will be prudent 
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enough to choose the "oversimplified manner", speaking about 
collusion in term of "coalition structure". In doing so 
we will use most of the formalization proposed by Owen 
(29), because of the relative rigorousness of his develop­
ment, and because of the possibility it offers for deriving 
most of the concepts of interest for our purpose. 
We will be concerned with a set N = l,2,...,n of all 
players (or individuals). "Any non-empty subset of N (in­
cluding N itself and all the one-element subsets) is called 
a coalition" (29, p. 157). We further define, as Owen does 
(29, p. 185), a coalition structure or a partition of N as 
T — {t^f ^2' •••» « 
By the characteristic function of an n-person game we 
mean a real-valued function, v, defined on the subset t of 
N, which assigns to each t its maximin value of the m-person 
game played between all the coalitions of the coalition 
structure T (an extension of the Owen's definition, 29, p. 
157). Thus v(t^) is the outcome that the members of t^ can 
obtain from the game regardless of what the other coalitions 
do. It follows that v(0) = 0. 
We assume that the individuals join the "non-overlapping 
coalitions", i.e., nobody can be member of two coalitions at 
one time, according to their free choice and rationality; 
these behavioral attributes were discussed in the 
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preceding chapter. From this it follows that nobody will 
join a coalition if he does not expect to obtain more than 
he can get by actions independent of the others. In other 
words, a coalition can exist only if the personal outcome 
of each member is higher than the one he can attain by 
acting independently. This can be better expressed by the 
concept of imputation, which we define following Owen (29, 
p. 159). 
An imputation is a vector x = x^ satisfying 
i. Z X. = V (t) 
iet ^ 
ii. X. > v({i}) for all iet. 1 — 
The games where coalitions are of interest to the indi­
viduals, i.e., the games where x\>v({i}) for all iet, x^ being 
defined as above, are called essential games. The others 
are called inessential games. Strictly competitive games 
and, more generally, constant-sum games are inessential 
in the sense that the best that any coalition could bring 
to the individuals is equivalent to what they can obtain 
by themselves: 
Xj^ = v({i}) for all iet. 
All imputations are not equivalent. The only process 
by which we can compare them without involving interpersonal 
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comparisons is by the concept of domination. This concept 
can be defined as follows: if we let x and y be two im­
putations and t be a coalition, then x dominates y through 
t if 
i, x^>y% for all iet, 
ii. I x.£v(t); (Owen, 29, p. 160). 
iet 
The set of all undominated imputations for a game v is 
called the core, which is noted C(v) (29, p. 163). 
An example; milk bargaining cooperative 
The example of milk producers illustrates well what we 
said about the development of a coalition, i.e., the decision 
of individuals to cooperate. A milk producer alone, inde­
pendent of other milk producers, has often no alternative 
but to sell his milk to the local handler at a rate deter­
mined by the handler alone or not to sell it and then lose 
the milk value. The bargaining power of the individual 
milk producer is negligible compared to the milk handler's 
bargaining power. 
If two milk producers of the same area go to see the 
handler for an increase in the milk price, threatening to pool 
their resources to send their milk to the handler of another 
area if they do not get satisfaction, then the handler may 
be inclined to give partial satisfaction to them. 
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The increase in the milk price due to the joint bargain­
ing power of the two milk producers defines the imputation 
of the extra profit due to cooperation. Both producers 
have been made better off by grouping their bargaining power. 
Other milk producers may be attracted by the profit 
resulting from the small coalition bargaining power. They 
may decide to join the group, use the strategy selected 
by the group, e.g., hold the milk below a certain price, 
and then take advantage of the extra profit due to coopera­
tion. The bargaining power of the coalition is increased 
by the introduction of new members. Better strategies can 
be devised and higher milk price may result from further 
negotiations with the handlers. The imputation resulting 
from an increase in the size of the milk bargaining coopera­
tive dominates the former imputations. Every member of the 
cooperative is made better off by the enlargement of the 
coalition. 
Coalitions and coalition structure; theoretical development 
The outcomes to individuals are derived primarily from 
the coalition structure and from the imputation used in­
side each coalition. The vector characterizing both the 
coalition structure and the imputation simultaneously at a 
moment of time is called the payoff configuration. It is a 
pair (y, T) = (x^, X2,...,X^; t^, satisfying 
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I X. = v(t.) for k=l,2,...,m 
The problem is to find which payoff configuration will 
be reached. "An individually rational payoff configuration" 
is one which respects the requirement of individual ration­
ality: 
X >v({i}) for all ieN. 
X— 
"A coalitionally rational payoff configuration" is one for 
which any subcoalition cannot obtain, by itself, a better 
imputation than the one (x\, all iet^) provided by the 
coalition (t^). In other words there is not, in this case, 
any subcoalition set. for which Z x.<v(s) . 
ies 
"A coalitionally rational payoff configuration" will 
be stable, in the sense that no coalition has both the power 
and the inclination to change it, if it is at the same time 
an imputation in the core of the game. 
Theorem 2; Let v be an n-person game and T be any coalition 
structure. Then there is at least one vector x such that 
(x; T) belongs to the bargaining set of all stable indi­
vidually-rational payoff configurations. The proof can be 
found in Owen (29, p. 190). 
If T is such that (x; T) is "a coalitionally rational 
payoff configuration", then Theorem 2 means that, whatever 
^This definition and most of the following concepts can be 
found in more detail in Owen (29, p. 186-193). 
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the n-person general-sum game, there exists a best coopera­
tive solution if we can find the best coalition structure. 
The best coalition structure could be found by colluding 
individuals and subcoalitions until the point is reached 
where the individually-rational payoff configuration cannot 
be improved any further. But since any change in T brings a 
change in x, a simultaneous adjustment of T and x is necessary, 
with the rule that a change in T will be applied if and only 
if the resulting imputation dominates the preceding one. 
Theoretically, the complete building of a best coopera­
tive organization, i.e., cooperative organization with an un-
dominated imputation, from any game (including constant-sum 
games for which the solution is trivial) is possible. Nothing 
has been said about the uniqueness of the solution. There may 
be a set of equivalent coalition structures in the sense that 
these coalition structures lead either to the same imputa­
tion or, more likely, to one-comparable imputations, i.e., non-
dominant imputations. The concept of dominance, very close to 
the concept of Pareto optimum, is characterized by its in­
ability to compare different points on the boundary of a con­
vex set. We could show, using the assumptions generally ad­
mitted in welfare economics and presented at the beginning of 
the third section of this chapter, that the set of optimal 
coalition structures is part of the boundary of a convex set 
in m-dimensional space if there are m coalitions. It would 
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be sufficient to assume that all the coalitions embrace the 
assumptions of rationality and diminishing marginal utility 
as proposed for any individual. Coalitions, being aggregates 
of individuals, still follow individual behavior for an en­
larged set of choices. If it is not obvious that a group 
should react as an equivalent, powerful individual, this 
could be made as a specific assumption here. 
In a sense, the process of mixing individual sets into 
coalition sets could be described as a mapping from one n-
dimensional space to another m-dimensional space. This 
mapping has some isomorphic properties and then maintains 
the essential shape of the sets, i.e., their convexity. 
The set, S, of possible payoffs for the two-person game, 
as discussed in the third section of this chapter, was convex. 
The number of players would not affect the convexity of this 
set, it would only modify it in space dimensionality as long 
as all the individual players act according to the assump­
tions. The mapping from the convex set in the n-dimensional 
space of the players acting as individuals to the m-dimensional 
space set of the coalitions will not affect the convexity 
property (isomorphy). The coalition set is also convex. 
There is, then, a convex continuous "negotiation set" of 
feasible optimal coalition structures to choose from. 
The selection cimong the optimal coalition structures 
would involve comparisons among optimal imputations, in the 
sense of Pareto optimality, and thus would involve inter­
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personal comparisons. The use of some scheme, such as the 
one elaborated by Nash at the individual level with the 
help of some more axioms considering in particular the 
relative power of different coalition sizes, could perhaps 
do the job. But this is too complex to be done here. 
Coalitions and coalition structure in milk bargaining 
orqani zations 
It is interesting to relate the theoretical results to 
real bargaining cooperative organizations. This can be done 
by developing further the example of a milk bargaining 
cooperative in relation to milk handlers. 
The effectiveness of a coalition depends upon its 
ability to make the antagonistic party believe that the 
threat can be realized. This necessitates the presence 
of a good discipline inside the coalition. If the coalition 
members decide to hold the milk to get a higher price but 
only a few of them really do so when they are asked to, 
because of the cost it implies, the group loses part of its 
bargaining power. It is not going to obtain the expected 
outcome out of the bargaining process and, furthermore, it 
loses for the future part of its ability to make the opponent 
believe in the effectiveness of the threat. The bargaining 
power of a coalition increases with the dimension of the 
coalition so far as the coalition can maintain some strict 
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discipline êunong its members. 
Milk producers of different areas or even of the same 
area may have a variety of problems in relation to milk 
quality, farm dimension, etc... They may not agree fully 
with the general objectives of a unique bargaining coopera­
tive. Some milk producers facing the same type of situation 
may find some advantages to develop a coalition of their 
own. Rational considerations at the level of the sub-
coalition, i.e., "coalitionally rational payoff configuration", 
may lead the new more homogeneous group to secede from the 
former coalition, and then to modify the coalition structure 
of milk bargaining at the regional level. 
In the same way, since bargaining cooperatives are 
voluntary coalitions of persons, rational considerations at 
the level of the individuals, i.e., "individually rational 
payoff configuration", may lead some persons to move from 
one coalition to another. A bargaining cooperative offering 
a better outcome to its members will attract new members 
and members from other cooperatives. 
The free move of members from one cooperative to another 
and the possible aggregation or disaggregation of coalitions 
according to individual and coalition rationalities 
respectively lead the bargaining cooperative system in one 
region toward a best coalition structure, i.e., toward an 
efficient regional cooperative organization both globally 
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(at the coalition level) and individually (at the individual 
level). 
Conclusion 
This chapter concerns the analysis of the collusion 
of individuals into coalitions. The game theory approach 
is well adapted to the study of why and how the coalitions 
develop. The grouping of individuals into coalitions cannot 
be justified without introducing some efficiency considera­
tions. The most important individual motivation to enter 
a coalition is his expectation to improve by this way his 
personal payoff. In game terminology we say that a coali­
tion develops (individuals join a coalition) if and only 
if individuals believe that the game is essential, i.e., 
that the distribution of the coalition outcome may provide 
each member with a payoff superior to the one he can secure 
by himself outside the coalition. 
In this chapter we have considered two complementary 
meanings of cooperation, i.e., cooperation between two 
individuals with partially antagonistic aims, and cooperative-
collusions where individuals join in coalitions which can 
bargain better than the individuals can do individually. 
The sustaining idea of cooperation is essentially the same in 
both cases; only the dimension of the game and the activity 
of the individuals are slightly different. In the first case. 
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an individual cooperates with another individual and still 
continue to bargain with him. The objective is the im­
provement of the set of possible payoffs. In the second 
case, the individual chooses to enter into a group and 
leaves to the group the problem of bargaining with other 
individuals and groups. Nevertheless, bargaining inside 
coalitions still remains to determine the distribution of 
the common benefit, i.e., the form of the imputation to 
be used. The individuals, being rational (as expressed in 
the first chapter), want to obtain the greatest amount of 
utility from their activity in general, and from their 
cooperativeness in particular. 
The coalition activity is subdivided in two separate 
but complementary activities; the activity of bargaining 
(the production activity) and the activity of distribution 
of the outcome of the bargain among the coalition members. 
The bargaining or production activity of the coalition 
(cooperative) is related by the concept of coalition ratio­
nality to the notion of global efficiency. According to 
coalition rationality, the cooperative may develop (increase 
in dimension by the introduction of new members into the 
coalition) until the point where the addition of a new 
member does not improve any more the economic situation of 
the others considered as a group. At this point the develop­
ment of a subcoalition from the former coalition may become 
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efficient from the point of view of the subcoalition, i.e., 
the global outcome of the subcoalition may become greater 
than the aggregate outcome of the subcoalition members inte­
grated into the coalition. 
The distribution activity of the cooperative is related 
by the concept of individual rationality to the notion of 
individual efficiency. According to individual rationality, 
an individual joins a coalition if he expects to be made 
better off by doing so. The individual is then very much 
concerned by the process of distribution (imputation) of the 
cooperative outcome among members. The cooperative can be 
globally efficient, i.e., the total outcome of the 
cooperative is greater than the aggregate outcome of the 
members acting independently of each other (without coopera­
tive) and is undominated by any other coalition structure 
(among the members) global outcome. An individual will 
not join it if he does not expect to get more inside the 
cooperative than he can get by himself outside the cooperative. 
An undominated imputation defines an individually 
efficient situation. Such a cooperative solution is simul­
taneously globally efficient. If it was not, a better 
coalition structure, more efficient globally than the former 
could be devised; and an imputation of the global outcome 
dominating the former imputation could be found. Neverthe­
less, a globally efficient cooperative organization may not 
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be individually efficient because of the type of imputation 
used to distribute the global outcome. 
We did not go that far, but there does not appear to 
be any theoretical reason, if we maintain the concept of 
symmetry for the individuals inside coalition, which would 
make Nash's solution invalid in the determination of the 
imputation to be applied in any coalition. 
What difference is there between Nash's solution, re­
sulting from the distribution of additional utility among 
individuals according to ratios equal to the rates at which 
this utility can be transferred, and what is actually done 
inside most cooperatives? The actual solution used by 
cooperatives is to distribute gains to their members "in 
proportion to the use they make of its services" (32). 
Such a solution from Nash's scheme would not work without the 
explicit assumption that all the individuals have the same 
utility function and the scime wealth. An argument supporting 
the process used by actual cooperatives is its simplicity. 
One would not think of allocating rewards according to the 
particular shape of the utility functions. The imputations 
used by actual cooperatives are probably not optimal, but 
they are simple. Are there imputations closer to the optimum 
and still relatively simple? This question will be examined 
in the next chapter. 
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RESOURCE COOPERATIVE: PROGRAMMING APPROACH 
The game theory approach dealt with the aggregation of 
individual bargaining power into coalition bargaining power. 
In this chapter we will assume the existence of a coalition 
and we will analyze more specifically the process of indi­
viduals pooling their resources together. 
The resource exchange activity between two individuals 
is developed in the first section. This simplified approach 
to a cooperative helps to put in evidence the concept of 
external economies. 
The programming approach is used to analyze the process 
of pooling resources between entrepreneurs. This approach 
helps to formalize more clearly and also more practically 
than the game approach could do, the global and individual 
efficiency concepts. The cooperative activity is still 
subdivided into two activities : the production activity and 
the distribution activity. The fact that globally efficient 
cooperatives may not be individually efficient is considered 
in detail. The actual cooperative organization characterized 
by its uniform dividend type of imputation is compared to an 
alternative cooperative organization using a different system 
of imputation; the multiplicative imputation. 
The pooling of activities as well as of resources among 
the firms in a resource cooperative, according to some 
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specific rules (derived from the techniques of decomposition 
of a programming problem), is shown to improve (in general) 
the global efficiency of the cooperative and therefore its 
potential individual efficiency. This process can be used 
to derive, within an industry, a best coalition structure 
as defined in the preceding chapter. 
Two-person, Two-input, Two-output Problem 
As a first approach to resource distribution between 
firms, the two-person case will be considered. Also, this 
seems to be the best framework within which to consider the 
treatment of externalities. 
The model 
Consider an economy comprised exclusively of two resources 
x^, i=l, 2, inelastically supplied (fixed resource endow­
ments) , and two firms each producing only one of the two 
different goods Qj, j=l, 2. Firm 1 produces good with in­
puts x^j^ and Xg^, and firm 2 produces Qg with x^g and X22' 
*11 ^12 ~ *1 (fixed) ; 
*21 *22 ~ *2 (fixed) . 
To facilitate the discussion of the effect of ex­
ternalities, let 0^ be apple production and Qg be honey 
production. In functional form, the production functions 
are represented as: 
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Ql - (Xii' *21^' 
^ (*12' *22' • 
Assume that: 
90. a^ Q. 9Q, aZg 
for all i,j=l,2. 
The individuals 1 and 2 attach each respectively to the 
production level of their firm a utility number and U2. 
We denote these relationships as follows: 
au.  3^U. 
U. = U. (Q.), ân^ > 0, —^ < 0, i=l,2; 
the utility functions are consistent with the axioms 
proposed in Chapter 1. Unused quantities of have zero 
value. 
Case of no exchange of resources among producers 
Assume that any exchange of resources between the two 
firms is forbidden. In this case the maximization of the 
utility of each entrepreneur considered separately is obtained 
by the use of the best combination of the resources they 
dispose of, as specified by the production functions. This 
solution is analogous in some sense to the non-bargaining 
game solution considered in the preceding chapter. The maxi-
min strategies described there correspond to the point A of 
Figure 6, i.e., the utility solution of a non-exchange 
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Figure 6. Edgeworth box diagram and the utility solution 
of a non-exchange economy 
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economy (non-bargaining solution). 
Case where exchange of resources among producers is permitted; 
the competitive solution 
The set R, closed and bounded by the two indifference 
curves, is convex. This follows from the assumptions about 
the production and utility functions. All the points in R 
are combinations of resources which both entrepreneurs 
prefer or are indifferent to (we assume non-satiety). 
Therefore, a bargaining solution is preferred by both indi­
viduals to the nonbargaining solution. 
Our purpose is now to describe the feature of the non-
cooperative bargaining solution. We assume that the resource 
exchange will be made according to the rules common to 
perfectly competitive market. 
As is well described in Bator (4), the set of solutions 
satisfying the conditions of "exchange efficiency" is given 
by the points on the contract curve in Figure 6 where the 
marginal rate of substitution of Xg^ for x^^ (in firm 1) 
is equal to the marginal rate of substitution of X22 for ^^ .2 
(in firm 2). This can be written as: 
This means simply that the set of solutions represents the 
points along the respective indifference curves for which. 
*21'*11 
9Ut 9U. 3U 1 / 1 .  £ .  »  
*22'*21 
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3*21 ^  3*22 
3*11 3*12 
Since firms 1 and 2 will only be satisfied with points 
in set R, the feasible set of solutions is restricted to 
those points on the contract curve in set R. The selection 
of the unique point results from bargaining between 1 and 
2. Nash's scheme could be used; this was described in the 
preceding chapter. 
External economies and the cooperative solution 
As was expected from the competitive solution and as 
will be recognized later on, the external economies have 
not been taken into consideration. This is not surprising 
if we consider what is meant by this concept. Following 
Viner's definition as expressed by Bator (3): 
"... External economies belongs to a more general doc­
trine of'direct interaction', which consists in the 
interdependence that are external to the price system 
and hence unaccounted for by market valuations. 
Analytically, it implies the non-independence of 
various preference and production functions. Its 
effect, therefore, is to cause divergence between 
private and social cost-benefit calculation, i.e., 
the market imputed rates of renumeration (private 
marginal product) will not match the marginal social 
product" (3). 
The cooperative solutions to the problem of resource 
distributions among firms can be obtained using the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern process of joint maximization of 
utility, resources are freely exchanged. 
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A side payment or rather an appropriate imputation of 
the common outcome is used to compensate or charge the firm 
creating the externalities. 
"Edgeworth believed in the measurability of utility 
and in the possibility of making interpersonal com­
parisons. Consistent with this belief was his ob­
servation that there would be one imputation on the 
contracc curve that would have the property of joint 
maximality which would make it more desirable than all 
others. This is called the 'utilitarian point'" 
(40, p. 46). 
The "utilitarian point" could be defined in our problem 
as the appropriate combination of the two resources in the 
two production processes which would maximize the sum of the 
two utilities and Ug. We surely do not subscribe to 
Edgeworth's belief, but since the "utilitarian point" is 
one cooperative solution among all the set of possible 
cooperative solutions defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
we can use it as an element of comparison with the com­
petitive solution. 
The cooperative problem so defined can be best written 
using the Lagrangean form: 
(1) L — ^1 '*21^ ^ ^ ^ 2 ^^2 ^*12 '^22 '^ ^ 
+ + r2(*2-*21-X22)-
The mixtures of the inputs which maximize the aggregate 
utility is given by the solutions to the following system 
of equations: 
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(2) ^ ^ ^ 
(3) 
( 6 )  
(7) 
9L _ 3U, 90% 3U. 902 90i 
3*11 90^ 3*11 3^2 90^ 9*11 
9L _ 3U2 902 
- ^ 1 ' 
= 0 
3*12 - 90: 3*12 
3L _ ^"i 30i . '"2 902 90i 




- ^ 2 
= 0 







= X - V _ - X = 0 _ 
(4) ^^ - ^ 2 = ° 
(5) 
dr^ 2 "^21 "22 
Equations (6) and (7) assure that all the resources are 
used in the two production processes. Equations (2) and 
(3) can be combined in (8), 
3U. ao, 9U_ 9Q- 3Q, 90, 
/Q\  -L -L — 6  r  ^  ^  ^  -L 1  
90^ 9x^1 9Q2 ^9x^2 ^^11 
and (4) and (5), in the same manner, give (9), 
9U. 90. 9U. 90, 90, 90, 
(9) =. = = = — ^ 1 
90^ 9X21 302 9X22 ^0]^ 9x^1^ ' 
302 
As related in the assumptions of the model, > 0. 
90i 
This characterizes the nonindependence of various production 
functions which implies further the interdependence of the 
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two utility functions. External economies must be taken 
into account for the determination of the equilibrium mixture 
of resources. 
Equations (8) and (9) specify the two equilibrium con­
ditions. They could be reduced to one condition by the use 
of ratios or marginal rates of substitution. 
The resource distribution resulting from a cooperative 
ao, 
strategy which can consider external effects (gQ— > 0), give 
the advantage to the apple grower, 1, because of the direct 
repercussion of the number of apple trees on honey production. 
In other words, if we assume the existence of a competitive 
resource market with prices r^ and r^ f the apple grower 
cooperating with the honey producer will use the resources 
at an intensity level superior to the one dictated by his 
own particular interest (marginal cost = marginal revenue 
for each resource use), because of the external effect of 
his production on honey production. The cooperative solution 
maximizes the aggregate utility by the use of the so called 
"social cost-benefit calculation"; the competitive solution 
cannot really do this. Therefore, an imputation can be 
found, consistent with the aggregate utility, which dominates 
the competitive type of imputation. The use of a cooperative 
strategy in the case where external economies exist within 
the coalition can lead to a solution dominating any 
competitive solution. 
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The imputation following the process of joint maximi­
zation of utility can be determined by bargaining between 
the players, and so can be theoretically derived by using 
Nash's scheme, assuming the feasibility of the Nash's axioms. 
General Problem: Programming Approach 
The programming approach will be used to focus on the 
relative efficiency of a resource cooperative as compared to 
a group of individually-competitive firms. Two variations 
of the problem will be considered: (1) employing a non-
aggregative model, i.e., no change in the number of firms 
is permitted; and (2) employing an aggregative model where 
the number of firms is not fixed and as firms discontinue 
operations, resources are reallocated among the remaining 
firms. 
For the nonaggregative-type model, the Kornai-Liptak 
decomposition algortihm (18) will be appropriate to study 
the process of resource reallocation in the short run among 
existing firms of an industry. 
A special formalization, in some sense derived from the 
Kornai-Liptak decomposition algorithm, will be used to in­
vestigate the process of resource reallocation, when the 
number of firms varies. The so-called aggregative model 
will deal with relatively long run problems where almost 
all resources can be transferred from one firm to another. 
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Nonagqreqative model; the Kornai-Liptak decomposition 
algorithm^ 
The general framework of this model is an industry 
composed of n firms. Each firm has an input-output trans­
formation matrix, k=l,2,...,n, and a resource vector u^ . 
The outputs of each firm are represented by the vector 
with a corresponding profit vector, Cj^ . 
Linear programming does not deal well with decreasing 
returns; therefore the assumption of decreasing marginal 
utility presents problems. Consequently, the following 
analysis, for reason of simplification, will be made using 
the assumption of profit maximization. This assumption is 
based on a postulated positive relationship between profits 
and utility for each entrepreneur. The assumption also 
facilitate treatment of the problem of resource imputations. 
The opportunity cost of an increase in operationalism is 
often a decrease in realism. 
The Kornai-Liptak decomposition algorithm The Kornai-
Liptak decomposition algorithm is essentially a method of 
solving a single linear programming problem (the overall 
program) involving many relatively independent sectors. The 
decomposition of the big program into a set of subprograms 
to be solved by the mutually independent sectors coordinated 
^In this section, a simultaneous extensive use of the 
Kornai-Liptak article (18) and of the review of the method by 
Professor J, K. Sengupta in his course on Operations Research 
has been made. 
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by the center can be interpreted as a theoretical simplifi­
cation of the general problem. This nevertheless has a more 
practical interpretation; the principle of decomposition 
clearly defines a decentralization system of decision making, 
the center coordinating the sector mutually independent 
decision processes. The process of coordination from the 
center in this two-level planning is very important. It 
consists of the sequential redistribution of the total 
resource vector among sectors in such a way as "to attain 
conformability and optimality of sector programs with the 
overall program" (39). It is this special activity of the 
center in the reallocation of the resources between sectors 
which gives to the whole system the characteristics of a 
generalized resource cooperative organization. 




where A = (A^, A^, .../ A^), x' = (x^, x^, ..., x^), 
n 
c' = (c^, Cg, .../ c^), and the resource vector, b = Z u^ . 
k—1 
The problem can also be written, 
n 
max Z c' X, 
k=l ^  ^ 
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n 
subject to Z A, X, < b 
k=l ^ ^ 
Xj^   ^0/ k—1 * 
Each sector (or firm) maximization problem could be 
written as follows, 
max c^ Xj^ 
subject to Aj, x^ £ u^ 
Xk > 0 
m We write u = I I I as being the resource distribution 
LuJ 
vector. The specification of this vector defines the central 
problem. The specification of x^ and of the shadow price 
vectors k=l,2,...,n, for any given resource distribution 
u, defines the sector problems. 
For any feasible u, i.e., ueU, where 
U 5 {u^: Z u^=b, k=l,2,...,n}, each sector optimum (firm 
optimum) presents the following characteristics: 
f%(u%) = max c^ x^ = min y^ u^ (k=l,2,...,n) 
is continuous and piecewise-linear concave function of Uj^  
and hence their sum, the overall optimum, 
n 
f (u) = Z ft(u,) 
k=l ^ ^ 
is well defined and concave. 
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The central problem can be formulated as a decomposition 
of the u vector into sector allocations u^ such as to 
maximize f(u). The sectors solve their optimization problem 
using the components u^. The iterative process which is 
generated between center and sectors defines a sequential 
gcime where the center is the maximizing player, i.e., 
max f(u), and the team of sectors is the minimizing player, 
ueU 
i.e., min y^ u^. The strategies of the center are feasible 
allocation patterns (i.e., elements u^ in U), those of the 
team of sectors are the feasible shadow price systems in 
the duals of the sector programs, and the payoff function 
is the sum of the dual sector objective function.^ 
If we denote by V the set of feasible sector shadow 
price system teams, and by v the set of vectors of shadow 
prices selected by the sectors, i.e., v = Yi 
in 
, the sector 
team strategies can be described by the expression min v'u 
veV 
and the overall program optimum, in other words the value 
of the game, is expressed by 
Z"*" = max min v'u 
ueu veV 
If we let U define the set of strategies of the maxi­
mizing center, and V the set of strategies of the minimizing 
^As stated by Professor J. K. Sengupta in his course 
on Operations Research. 
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sector team, v*u denoting the payoff function, the overall 
programming problem can be defined as a polyhedral game. 
This game, as suggested by Kornai and Liptak, can be solved 
by the use of the fictitious play method of Brown and 
Robinson. In this method, against each central strategy 
(ueU), it is feasible to state an optimum counter strategy 
v^ = v*(u), while against each sector strategy veV, it is 
feasible to state an optimal counter strategy 
u"*" = u^(v) , i.e., 
v+(u)'u = min (v'u) 
veV 
v' u+(v) = max (v'u).^ 
ueU 
The series of optimal strategies and counterstrategies 
can be shown to lead towards a point of convergence. Since 
the convergence can be very slow at the end of the fictitious 
process of playing, a 5-termination rule may be used. 
The game is stopped whenever 
Z+(N) - Z"*" (N-1) < 6 
where N and N-1 represent the sequence indices of the game, 
i.e., whenever the performance z"*" cannot be significantly 
improved by further iteration between center and sectors. 
^As stated by Professor J. K. Sengupta in his course 
on Operations Research. 
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At this point the resource allocation is 6-optimum and 
the solution of the sector programs using this optimal 
allocation of resource leads to an optimal overall vector 
_ n _ 
of activities X = 2 x, . 
k=l * 
Using a bar above letters to indicate optimality and 
n 
also using Z as the overall performance (Z = Z c/ x, ), the 
k=l ^ K 
overall solution obtained by the two-level planning can be 
shown to conform to the following relation; 
Z(X, Û) ^  Z{X, u) > Z(X, u) 
for any ueU, the feasible resource allocation set. The 
performance realized by the industry where a reallocation 
of resource among firms takes place according to the two-
level planning method, before the production process 
starts, dominates the performance obtained either by an 
industry which does not use a planned resource realloca­
tion, or by any other industry using any other type of 
short run reallocation of resources. 
Resource cooperative ; correction of the resource market 
imperfections The two-level planning method involves 
successive revisions of the shadow prices and of the resource 
allocation until the optimal stage is attained. The sequence 
of adjustments played between the center and the sectors is 
only hypothetical, fictitious as the method of Brown and 
Robinson suggests. This sequence defines a Walrasian 
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"tâtonnement process""during which no transactions (no 
production) actually take place until equilibrium is 
reached" (27, p. 43). This method has a great advantage 
over the so-called non-tâtonnement process, which could be 
figured by a real play between center and sectors where each 
strategy move involves a period of time where production 
takes place, it only involves real economic operations in 
the most efficient conditions. 
We consider that in absence of the two-level planning, 
or more precisely, in absence of any planning, the natural 
process of resource allocation between sectors takes place 
according to non-tâtonnement processes. In other words, the 
resource market of the industry concerned does not present 
all the required characteristics of a perfectly competitive 
market. The lack of mobility of the resources and the 
imperfect knowledge of the sectors on the trade possibilities 
which are normally open to them are the principal reasons of 
the imperfection of the market. The resource market adjust­
ment, for these reasons, is not instantaneous, it may even 
take a long time. 
The main consequence of the imperfection in the resource 
market is the non-homogeneous valuations of the resources. 
Some resources may exist in relative scarcity in one firm 
and receive relatively high imputed values, while the same 
resources are in excess in other firms and have very low 
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shadow prices. The cooperative strategy used at the industry 
level corrects the discrepancy between resource imputed 
values from one firm to the other. As a matter of fact, the 
successive fictitious plays correct the differences between 
price valuations of resources among firms, in such a way 
as to establish at the end of the sequence, a unique resource 
price vector y which is common to all the firms. This 
unique price vector reflects the relative scarcity of 
resources at the industry level. 
This convergence towards a unique price vector, accord­
ing to the process of two-level planning, is purely theoreti­
cal. Some semi-fixed resources cannot be exchanged freely 
between firms. Some transport costs are also involved 
which directly affect the real homogeneity of the shadow 
price system. Nevertheless, as Dhrymes shows clearly in 
(7), these elements, to which uncertainty could be added, 
can be introduced in a broader theoretical framework still 
consistent with the preceding development. 
We now try to go further in the process of comparison 
between the spontaneous solution, i.e., the solution which 
results from the use of competitive strategies from the 
sectors, and the cooperative solution which involves a 
tâtonnement process in the reallocation of resources. 
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Extra profit due to cooperation As has already been 
noted, at the industry level the competitive solution, i.e., 
Z(X, u), is dominated by the cooperative solution, 
Z(X, Û) : 
Z(X, u) £ Z(X, Û) . 
Following the simplex criterion for optimality, the competi­
tive optimum at the firm level presents the characteristic, 
- ik " 
since = c^ - y^^ = 0 for any optimal basis. This 
simply means that the firm (sectors) do not make extra 
profits. All the outcome c^ x^ of any firm is imputed in 
the cost of production y^ A^ x^. Since that is true for 
each firm, the following relation can be verified at the 
competitive industry level: 
kh =k *k - ?k Ak *k = 
If we redefine the programming problem by the equivalent form 
= max c^ x^ - y^ A^ x^ (maximization of profit) 
Ak 1 "k 
"k' ^ k Z 0' 
the following relation can be derived. 
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— — — 1 
E Zv ~ Z (X y u) = 0 ^ Z (X/ u) • 
k=l ^ 
The cooperative solution at the industry level shows the 
existence of an extra profit. The sum of partial equilibria 
equates the global equilibrium if and only if the resources 
in the industry are distributed optimally, i.e., if and only 
if the vector u corresponds exactly to the optimum vector u. 
Imputation of the extra profit; the multiplicative 
imputation The problem is now to decide on how the extra 
profit resulting from the use of the cooperative strategy 
should be distributed among sectors. Defining the extra 
profit as 
_ _ n _ 
E = Z(X, u) - S z. ^ 0, 
k=l ^ 
we need an imputation scheme to distribute it among the firms. 
For the new imputation to dominate the preceding (compe­
titive) imputation characterized by the number z^, we 
need to develop a vector w with elements w^ (k=l,2,...,n) 
which has the following properties : 
(1) . ~ *k' all k, where x^ is the 
optimal vector of the firm program when resource realloca­
tion is not used. 
^The following development has been made using ex­
tensively Dr. J. K. Sengupta's article (39). 
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n _ _ 
(2) . Z w, = Z (X, u) . 
k=l * 
Using the multiplicative decomposition, we define a scalar 
e as: 
e = Z (X, u)/(Z (X, u) , 
clearly, e^l. A multiplicative imputation conforming to 
the two conditions for dominance described above could be 
Wjç = e k=l,2,...,n . 
The imputation w so defined exhausts exactly the extra 
profit realized by cooperation; 
e = Z(X, u)/Z(X, u) = Z{X, u)/Zz , 
k ^  
and clearly Z (X, u) = e S z, = E e i, . 
k k ^ 
An analogous imputation would be obtained in multiplying 
the optimal shadow price vector of each firm (in the non-
cooperative case) by the scalar e; 
fk 1 * fk ' 
and since z^ = c^ x^ = b^ (L.P. duality theorem), 
e = Z (X, u)/Z b^ ^  and Z(x\ ui= e Z b^ y^ = Z b^ e y^ . 
The new imputation, permitted by the use of a cooperative 
strategy at the industry level, is feasible and furthermore 
dominates the preceding imputations (non-cooperative). 
Nevertheless, nothing permits us to say that this new im­
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putation is the best imputation. It is probably not the 
best if the firms are of different sizes and if entrepre­
neurs have utility functions of different shapes. To get 
a better imputation, i.e., to get a more acceptable benefit 
distribution from the individual's point of view, the 
introduction of active bargaining operations among entre­
preneurs would be necessary. Theoretically, Nash's scheme 
could help in the search for an optimal solution. But in 
practice these bargaining techniques are too complex to be 
expressed in operational form in a cooperative framework. 
Multiplicative and uniform imputations; a comparison 
We have already shown how the competitive solution, or rather 
the non-cooperative solution, is dominated by the cooperative 
solution along with the multiplicative imputation for the 
extra profit distribution. Consider now that a cooperative 
strategy is used to obtain the optimal allocation of resources 
among firms and to get the global equilibrium performance 
Z(X, u); however, instead of the multiplicative imputation, 
a uniform imputation is used to distribute the extra profit 
among firms. By uniform imputation we mean a distribution 
of the extra profit (or of the outcome) in proportion to 
the amount of resources provided by the members (the firms). 
More specifically, all resources subjected to reallocation 
between firms will be paid at a unique rate figured by the 
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unique shadow price vector (the dividend rate vector), 
whatever the firm which provides the resources. This is 
exactly the type of imputation which is generally used in 
the actual resource cooperatives. Let us call this im­
putation vector t^. The unique resource price vector 
resulting from the use of the cooperative strategy at the 
industry level is denoted by y. If the original resource 
vector at the firm level is denoted by Uj^, then clearly, 
t^ = y' u^ for k=l,2,—,n, 
and 
n _ _ 
S t. = Z(X, u) . 
k=l ^ 
The imputation {w^} has been shown to dominate the 
competitive (non-cooperative) imputation {z^l, this mostly 
by construction of {w^}. Can we show that {t^^ dominates 
{zj^} as well? In other words, can we show that, 
t^ _> for all k, 
and 
t^ > z^ for at least one k? 
It is possible to show that the cooperative solution could 
dominate the competitive one from the entrepreneur's point 
of view, only in the case where all the firms before coopera­
ting were producing at a common level of efficiency from an 
already good resource allocation between them. In these 
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circumstances the usefulness of the cooperative strategy 
could be questioned. In the cases where the firms are 
heterogeneous, the domination of the actual cooperative 
solution over the non-cooperative one cannot be shown without 
involving interpersonal comparisons. The cooperative global 
equilibrium performance still remains superior to the non-
cooperative one, but the actual cooperative imputation 
very likely shows these following characteristics : 
t. > z. for some ick, 
1 — X 
and 
tj < Zj for some jck, 
where {i} and {j} represent a partition of the indice set {k}. 
Since an individual is willing to enter into a 
cooperative organization only if this organization can 
assure him an outcome superior to the one he can obtain by 
himself, one thing is obvious from the above result: 
the subset of firms denoted by {j} is not going to be willing 
to cooperate. For these firms the non-cooperative strategy 
is preferable to the actual cooperative strategy, tj<Zj. The 
cooperative multiplicative imputation makes everybody better 
off, I.e., 
w^ ^  for all i, 
Wj Zj for all j, 
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and > Zjç for at least one k (using the same partition of 
indices as before). The cooperative homogeneous imputation 
does not create unanimity in favor of the cooperative 
strategy within the industry. 
An example of resource cooperative Appropriate 
exemples of resource cooperatives of the type described 
above can be found in most of the Eastern European Communist 
countries as the first stage of collective development. 
The best example would be the farm cooperative (group farming) 
at its first stage. Consider a village where farming was 
formerly done by individual entrepreneurs working on their 
own land with their labor and working capital. As everywhere 
there are good and bad farmers; there are rich with advanced 
tools and poor with little more than their hands. No 
capital is to come from outside the village. Three 
resources are to be put in common for their better use: 
land, capital and labor. The problem is one of reallocation 
of capital and labor on the land for a better outcome to be 
redistributed among people. 
If the reallocation of resources is well conducted, 
say according to a two-level planning model, extra profits 
can be made by cooperation. An imputation computed according 
to the multiplicative decomposition described above would 
make all people better off. Hardly any objection could be 
made to such a cooperative, except perhaps that some individ­
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uals would prefer to work their own business. But, often 
an accurate attribution of responsibilities according to 
competencies can overcome this objection. 
The following numerical example involving two entre­
preneurs, I and II, each possessing a fixed amount of two 
resources, K and L, will show more clearly the problem 
involved in the choice of the imputation. 
Suppose each entrepreneur possesses the following 
amount of resources : 
Kj = 20, Kjj = 40, 
Lj = 10, ^11 ~ ^ ' 
Outside of any cooperation, the imputations of the out­
comes of the firms I and II on the resources, given by the 
shadow prices of the two L.P. models are: 
y^ = $50, y_ = $10, 
I ^11 
Yr = $20, y = $50. 
I ^11 
This gives: 
Zj = $50 X 20 + $10 X 20 = $1200; 
Zjj =$10 X 40 + $50 X 5 = $ 650. 
We run another L.P. problem putting all the resources 
in common. An optimal reallocation of resources would show 
the following shadow prices common to both firms: 
= $30, y^ = $40. 
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The cooperative productive solution is then: 
Z = $30 (20 + 40) + $40 (10 + 5) = $2400. 
The cooperative productive solution is superior to the 
sum of the two individual solutions : 
$2400 > $1200 + $650. 
Consider now the imputation processes: 
a) Multiplicative imputation: 
e = 2400/1200 + 650 = 1.30. 
e Zj= $1560 > $1200; 
e Zjj = $840 > $650. 
Both entrepreneurs find advantage to cooperate. 
b) Actual cooperative solution: the distribution of dividends 
is made in proportion to the contribution in resources to 
the cooperative without regard to where the resource comes 
from. 
Zj = $30 X 20 + $40 X 10 = $1000 < $1200 < $1560; 
Zjj = $30 X 40 + $40 X 5 = $1400 > $ 840 > $ 650. 
The entrepreneur I will probably not cooperate, since 
it can obtain more by using an individual strategy than by 
using a cooperative strategy, II, on the contrary, will find 
all advantages in cooperation. 
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This example brings us to a clear differentiation between 
the productive solution of the cooperative and the distri­
bution of the outcome (imputation). It has been shown that 
the productive solution of a resource cooperative is always 
an efficient solution which dominates any non-cooperative 
solution (global efficiency), 
Z (X, Û) > Z (X, u) . 
Where u represents any resource allocation among firms. 
Nevertheless at the individual level, considerations about 
the global efficiency of the cooperative solution are not 
sufficient. The individual (the firm) is very much con­
cerned by the distribution of the outcome, i.e., he is 
interested in the imputation to be applied to the productive 
solution. An imputation which gives satisfaction to all 
individuals, respects the ordering of the past distribution 
of utility among them. The multiplicative imputation does 
that and assures, because of the relative productive effi­
ciency of the resource cooperative, each individual a premium 
proportional to what he was obtaining by himself. The divi­
dend type of imputation can very seldom create unamimity in 
resource cooperative. It often gives advantage to some 
individuals (the less active and the less efficient by 
themselves) and disadvantage to others (the more active 
and the more successful by themselves). In a sense, it does 
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not necessarily reward intelligence and efficacy. 
Aggregative model^ 
The cooperative production system just described in­
volves all the n firms (k=l,2,...,n), each with its own 
technology. All the technologies were to be used in the 
global production process. Only a redistribution of the 
resources among firms was permitted to maximize the global 
outcome. This cooperative system was very much restricted 
to short run activities. 
In the real world the cooperative activity often in­
volves more than a mere reallocation of resources. Often 
some improvement in the technology used accompanies the con­
centration of productive units in bigger and more productive 
firms. Our objective is now to develop and to analyze 
this process of concentration, integration we should say, 
of activities from the n initial firms to the m final best 
productive coalitions of firms (coalition of firms is defined 
here as a new unit of production substituted for the firms 
member of the coalition). 
Pooling of resources and activities among firms Define 
z(b) as being the optimal outcome of a firm corresponding to 
^Most of the ideas in this subsection resulted from 
communications with Professor J. K. Sengupta and from the 
reading of his article (39). 
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an optimal reallocation of resources in the industry; 
b = {bu}, where the index i, i=l,2,...,e, characterizes the 
nature of the resources. Clearly, = y^, the industry 
shadow price of the ith resource. Cooperative integration 
of activities as well as of resources is to be developed if: 
z(b + Xb) 2 z(b) + z(Xb), for X>0 (super additivity 
for X), i.e., if integration of activities is better than 
duplication. 
Consider two firms using technology and Ag 
respectively and realizing z^(bj^) and Zgfbg), respectively, 
after an appropriate resource distribution among them. Con­
sider furthermore that these two firms could be replaced by 
a unique firm (coalition of the two) with another technology 
matrix B. The new firm could utilize inputs b^ and h2 in such 
a way as to get a global outcome Z. The coalition (inte­
gration) is efficient if 
Z(b^ + bg) > z^fb^) + Z2(b2). 
Consider now the activity integration as well as the 
resource integration (reallocation) problems at the industry 
level. From a two-level planning procedure, a best re­
allocation of resource u have been developed and a globally 
optimal performance, i.e., Z(X, u), has been obtained. 
Assume now that technological changes appear providing the 
industry with a new set of transformation matrices, B, more 
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efficient than the preceding set, A. B involves some indi­
visibility in investment. It is economically feasible only 
for large firms. The indivisibility of some investment could 
be considered as the only cause of scale economies. 
Determination of an optimal resource and activity 
aggregation The problem is now to develop simultaneously 
or sequentially an optimal activity aggregation (a concen­
tration of firms into coalitions) along with a best realloca­
tion of resources among the new firms resulting from the 
coalition process. Any coalition j of some firms k must 
reasonably be formed if, 
Z. (x., u = Z Û ) > Z 2, (x , u.) (super additivity) . 
] ] ] kej * kej K * K 
The firm-coalition L.P. problem is, 
max Cj Xj = Zj 
B. X. < u. = Z û, ; X. > 0. 
^ ^ ~ 3 kej k ] -
If there are m such coalitions (j=l,2,...,m), the overall 
L.P. problem can be written as follows : 
m 
max Z c! X. 
j=l J ] 
subject to 
m 
Z B. X. < b 
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_ ^ 
We denote by Z(X, u.) the global outcome ( Z Z.) re-
3 j=l J 
suiting from the activity aggregation (coalition). It seems 
reasonable to suggest that a further reallocation of resources 
among coalitions, according to the two-level planning 
method, would improve the global performance of the industry. 
We then write, 
Z(X, Û) < Z(X. , u.) < Z(X., Û.). 
— ] ] — ] ] 
We may interpret the process of selection of a coalition 
structure as a process analogous in some sense to the simplex 
method of selection of an optimum basis in an L.P. problem. 
It can be shown that a change in the structure of the 
resource distribution among firms would not affect the 
optimality of the first selected coalition structure if 
this coalition structure remains feasible. The simplex 
criterion, Cj - yj A^, does not involve the resource vector. 
Z(Xj, Uj) is then the overall attainable optimum for the 
industry where activity aggregation is developed as well as 
the resource aggregation. 
The preceding method of developing coalitions, based 
upon the comparison between the coalition outcome and the 
aggregate outcome of the firms working independently, pre­
sents some theoretical interest. It focuses on the principle 
of activity aggregation and more generally on cooperation it­
self. But it has the disadvantage of requiring specific 
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elements of comparison and of requiring an important set of 
data. Furthermore, the activity aggregation realized firm 
by firm, leaves little possibility for partitioning the firm 
unit among different coalitions. This may result in some 
problems and even lead to sub-optimal global performance. 
We now try to develop a method of selection of the best 
coalition structure, using extensively the work of Professor 
J. K. Sengupta (39). 
Consider an industry composed of n firms. These firms 
are the existing firms having transformation matrices, A^, 
k=l,2,...,n, along with net return vectors c^ and resource 
vectors Uj^. Consider further that some technological progress 
has resulted in new transformation matrices with 
corresponding net return vectors Cj (j=l,2,...,m). It is 
important to note that no new firms have been built up 
yet. Bj and Cj only represent the characteristics of new 
potential firms. The number of these potential firms is 
assumed to be small. 
The overall problem can then be written, 
n m 
Max Z cJ X. + Z c! X. 
k=l ^ ^ j=l ] ] 
subject to 
n m 
E A, X, + S S. X. < b 
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And the two set of sectoral problems are; 
max c^ 
and 
*k 1 "k b 
^k 1 ° 
max Cj Xj 
B. X. < U. b 
J J — J 




U. = u,/b, U. = u./h, b = Z u, + Z u. 
K. < 3 3 k=l * j=l ] 
and where 
0<U.<1, 0<U.<1, and Z U, + Z U. = 1. 
- k- -3- k ^ i ] 
The Uj at the beginning of the process have zero values. 
The Kornai-Liptak decomposition algorithm can be used 
in this problem. The center develops a vector U (with 
and Uj elements). The sectors (including the fictitious 
firms j) compute the shadow price vectors corresponding to 
the resource allocation U. The polyhedral game so generated 
is terminated after a finite sequence of fictitious plays 
between the center and the sectors. The optimal outcome 
achieved can be written, Z (X, ÎJ) . The vector U represents 
the optimal resource distribution among the firms (the 
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existing and the fictitious firms as well), U = {U., U.}. 
K J 
The vector U also defines the best coalition structure 
in the sense that some components of this vector can be 
zero, i.e., the corresqonding firms should disappear, their 
technology and profit coefficients being dominated by other 
firms. Some other components are positive, i.e., the sub­
sisting firms as well as the new feasible firm units. The 
resources belonging formerly to the eliminated firms are 
reallocated eimong the others. 
This method develops simultaneously an optimal activity 
aggregation as well as an optimal resource allocation among 
firms of the industry. It has the advantages of considering 
all the possible coalition structures and of selecting among 
them for the most efficient one. But in a sense, the firm 
loses its independent organization. If one firm disappears, 
it is to be absorbed by one, maybe several other firms. 
No real concept of coalition, as described in the second 
chapter, is considered here. Entrepreneurs are not now con­
sidered as decision makers; the decision of entering one 
coalition instead of another one is not made by the entre­
preneur but by the system. 
Economically, the above process of resource as well as 
activity aggregation among firms leads to a global economic 
optimum; 
Z (X, Û) > Z (X, Û) . 
103 
Z (X, û) determines the overall outcome of the industry 
where only optimal resource aggregation is devised. Some 
entrepreneurs are reduced to the role of selling resources 
to other entrepreneurs. But, if we use a multiplicative 
imputation to the overall outcome, everybody will be made 
better off by the new system relative to the preceding one. 
Conclusion 
The relative efficiency of the productive solution 
resulting from the use of a cooperative strategy does not 
make any doubt. The gain of efficiency obtained by coopera­
tion (collusion) among economic units results essentially 
from the existence of an extra profit. The extra profit 
is derived from a benefit cost adjustment for externalities 
and from a correction for market imperfection. 
Resource cooperatives are often a first step towards a 
more integrated cooperative organization. As has been 
shown using Edgeworth's approach in a two firm model, this 
initial form of cooperation is partly justified by the 
economic advantage of taking account of external economies 
among firms cooperating together. Because of that important 
aspect, resource cooperatives and then any form of more 
integrated cooperatives can be considered as a big step 
towards public enterprise organizations. 
The non-aggregative model helps to show how the use of a 
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cooperative strategy for the distribution of resources within 
one industry reduces simply to the correction of the re­
source market imperfections. In the competitive solution 
the firm L.P. models would most likely show for the same 
resource, significant difference in the optimum shadow 
prices (imputed prices) from one firm to the other. The 
cooperative solution corrects this plurality of price systems 
by forcing a resource move between firms. In some sense 
we could describe the competitive solution as being the kind 
of solution obtained by using a Walrasian non-tâtonnement 
process. This process involves transaction at both equilibrium 
and non-equilibrium shadow prices. The cooperative solution 
would result instead from a tâtonnement process. Transactions 
are to take place only after the equilibrium shadow prices 
have been determined ("by comparing supply and demand at 
various hypothetical shadow prices" (39)). 
The simultaneous pooling of resources and activities 
in what we called the aggregative model is our first real 
attempt to describe what is normally considered as firm 
cooperative. The study of the integration process has shown 
that there might be some way to gain in global efficiency 
by not only pooling the resources, but also by integrating 
the activities as well. The efficiency of such operation 
is clearly expressed by the common belief that in some 
industrial sectors increasing returns to scale prevail. 
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The most important result of this chapter is the con­
clusions about the distribution of the cooperative outcomes 
among members. The results can be closely related to the 
ones observed in the preceding chapter where Nash's bargaining 
solution was confronted with the actual cooperative dis­
tribution process. The multiplicative imputation is not 
equivalent to the imputation obtained by the use of Nash's 
scheme. But it seems to be the closest one we have 
considered in this chapter. It will even be closer to 
Nash's bargaining solution if we consider that the bar­
gaining power of an entrepreneur is proportional to his 
efficiency in the use of his own resources. Such a correla­
tion between skill in production sector and cleverness in 
bargaining sector would not be surprising. 
It is interesting to note further that the multiplica­
tive imputation corresponds to a distribution of the 
cooperative benefit according to efficiency. In a labor 
cooperative that notion of efficiency translates into work 
productivity. But according to Sen (38) : 
"Distribution purely according to 'needs' tends to re­
sult in an under-allocation of labor in the coopera­
tive enterprise, and that purely according to 'work' 
tends to produce an over-allocation of it. 
Optimization requires a mixed system of distribu­
tion according to work and needs. More specifically, 
the proportion of income to be distributed according 
to work should equal the ratio of the elasticity of 
output with respect of labor to the relative share 
of cooperative income in the value of total output." 
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Things as we can see are then not so simple, and linear 
programming, as with game theory, is unable to give a complete 
answer. 
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FIRM COOPERATIVE: CLASSICAL ECONOMIC APPROACH 
In the preceding chapter we partitioned the question of 
cooperative efficiency in two almost independent problems : 
the problem of global efficiency and the selection of an 
imputation scheme for the extra profit (the problem of indi­
vidual efficiency). The global efficiency of the coopera­
tive system has never been considered as an element in­
fluencing the nature of the imputation scheme. Only some 
concluding remarks lead us to think that the process of im­
putation could affect the global efficiency of the system. 
As a matter of fact, the willingness of some individuals 
to cooperate under such types of imputation but not under 
others, as has been observed in the two preceding chapters, 
results in the selection of an imputation scheme having a 
determining importance on the nature and efficiency of the 
cooperative in question. 
This chapter will be oriented toward analyzing the nature 
of the relationship between choice of imputation and global 
efficiency. To simplify and to make the problem more under­
standable, the discussion will be restricted to the case of 
a simple labor cooperative, a Soviet kolkhoz (collective farm). 
Nevertheless, other forms of cooperatives, from the one-
input cooperatives (simple cooperatives) to the generalized 
cooperatives, could as well be used in the following develop­
ment. The essential problems remain whatever the complexity 
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of the material. The discussion and the conclusions in 
this chapter pertain to any type of cooperative which could 
be considered. 
Assumptions 
Most of the following assumptions can be found in Domar 
(8). The following development is made using extensively 
the results presented by this author. 
(1) All inputs but labor, the one provided by the 
members of the cooperative, are bought and all the outputs 
are sold by the cooperative at given (parametric) prices. 
(2) Instead of paying the input provided by members 
(labor), the cooperative redistributes the balance of its 
inflow and outflow among members. 
(3) If possessed by a profit maximizing firm, the 
production function of the cooperative would have all 
necessary and sufficient properties for a stable equilibrium 
under perfect competition. 
(4) The objective of the cooperative is the maximiza­
tion of the return to members for their participation in 
the cooperative activity. 
(5) There is complete certainty. 




The objective function, specified by Assumption 4, 
needs to be made more specific. The maximization of the 
return to members in relation to their participation to 
the cooperative activity suggests the kind of dividend 
maximization that Ward (45) and then Domar (8) proposed. 
This will be the interpretation employed in this chapter. 
Initially, together with the discussion in the first chapter 
on decision behavior, we are tempted to give a more sophisti­
cated interpretation of the maximization statement, con­
sidering the return more as a utility value than as a monetary 
value (dividend). Because of the problems of treating 
interpersonal comparisons, a vector maximization problem is 
set up. 
Model I 
1. max (p^%) k=l,2,...,m; 
subject to 
2. f(X) = 0 




Pnk ''nk = Pi ''i -
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Uj^ represents the utility obtained by the kth individual, 
Uj^ is a function of the imputation or monetary value p^^ 
the kth member receives for one unit of labor he provides 
to the cooperative. 
The labor x^ is considered in this chapter as being an 
homogeneous input. This justifies the kind of aggregation 
used in 4. Equation 3 represents the supply function of 
labor, one for each individual. The amount of labor 
provided by the kth member is a function g^ of the price 
paid for it. In the generalized production function given 
in 2, X represents the vector of aggregate inputs and out­
puts; X = (x^, Xg, ..., x^). Inputs are expressed in 
negative units, and outputs in positive. Equation 5 is 
an equilibrium equation, i.e., members receive from the 
cooperative, in payment of the labor they provide, the 
balance of its inflow and outflow. 
Assuming that both the as well as g^^ are concave 
functions of p^^, and that f(X) is well behaved as noted in 
Assumption 3, the maximization problem is theoretically 
solvable. There exists an imputation p^^, k=l,2,...,m, 
which is sustained by the cooperative activity. 
Nevertheless no cooperative in the world would be able 
to use such a model of maximization to solve for an optimal 
imputation vector. The particular knowledge of each member's 
utility and labor supply functions required in this model. 
Ill 
and the difficulties involved in the computation of vector 
maximization make it impractical. 
Model II 
A simplification of model I is necessary. Modifications 
of the objective function and of the aggregate supply function 
are required. To do that, we assume that all labor is to be 
paid a uniform rate. This corresponds to the principle 
that a homogeneous good should be paid a given price inde­
pendently of the individual who provides it. According to 
that change, the supply function of labor can now be written: 
3'- *nk=9^<Pn'' 
m 
"•> " k!l ""k-
An aggregate supply function equivalent to 3' and 4' 
could take the simplified form; 
This formulation "so obtained presents not theoretical but 
specification difficulty" (30). 
9p: 
3U. 
The additional assumptions that -5— > 0, and 
n 
—5— < 0, for all k, make possible and meaningful a sub-
„ 
stitution of the preceding objective function by a simple 
maximization of p^, the dividend rate. The problem now 
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becomes : . 
n-1 
S p. X. - R 
i=l ^ ^ 
6. max = — 
subject to 
7. f(X) = 0 
which we call the model II. 
Neglecting for a while the supply function 8, the system 
simplifies to the Domar "pure model" of a cooperative (8). 
Domar shows that if the cooperative is actually able to 
employ the optimum number of labor units (maximizing the 
dividend rate), then "the equilibrium position of the 
cooperative is identical in every respect to that of its 
capitalist twin". The "capitalist twin" is defined as a 
profit maximizing firm with the same production function 
and prices as the cooperative, and with a wage rate 
initially equal to the cooperative dividend rate (Assump­
tion 7/ in the Domar's article, 8, p. 737). Domar shows 
that the second order conditions for a maximum are the same 
for both the cooperative and the capitalist twin. 
These results can be best summarized by the Figure 7. 
The equilibrium position of the cooperative is worked 
out in two steps. First, the cooperative maximizes p^ for 
any supply of labor and then obtains the ABC dividend rate 




value of the marginal 
product of labor 
Labor, X 
n 
Figure 7. Case where the supply of labor sustains the 
optimal dividend rate 
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for labor, second, the cooperative selects the highest 
feasible dividend rate p^ out of the ABC curve. The maximum 
dividend rate p^ is given by the coordinates of point B. 
This optimum is sustained by an appropriate supply function 
of labor. 
A slight change in the value of the rent R would shift 
the ABC curve (the dividend rate curve) upward (dR<0) or 
downward (dR>0). An excess supply or an excess demand of 
labor corresponding to the new absolute maximum of p^ 
would then develop. This new absolute maximum of p^ would 
not be feasible according to our model. At a given dividend 
rate, a certain amount of labor is offered and the coopera­
tive is required to use it if it is in excess supply or to 
do without it if it is short of the optimum supply. At 
this point of the discussion, the difference in strategy used 
by the cooperative and the competitive twin is great indeed. 
For the competitive firm a change in the value of rent would 
not affect at all the activity level of the firm in the 
short run. The steady equilibrium consistent with the supply 
of labor would not be disturbed. 
The effects of changes in prices of inputs or outputs 
are more complex to analyze. Domar (8) has made a good 
outline of these in the case where the labor supply follows 
any necessary changes to maintain the dividend rate at its 
absolute maximum. This supply behavior being unrealistic. 
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some paradoxical results are developed, but they do not have 
much interest for our purpose. 
Imputation Problem 
Case of moderate labor shortage 
Suppose that following either a price change or an 
increase of the value of the rent R, the system in equilibrium, 
described by Figure 7, modifies to become a system with a 
slight shortage of labor. Figure 8 describes this situation. 
The cooperative strategy, described by the model II of 
maximization, selects the point K as stable equilibrium 
point. At this point, demand and supply of labor are equal, 
p° denotes the imputation selected by the system. 
It is important to note at this point the similarity 
between the process of selection of a uniform optimal im­
putation, provided by the model II of maximization, and 
the actual strategy used in most cooperative firms. A 
dairy cooperative for example which suffers from a shortage 
in milk supply relative to the plant capacity, is exactly 
in the situation described above. Because of the applica­
tion of an uniform dividend rate, cooperatives suffering 
from plant overcapacity are bound to select suboptimal 
equilibrium points like K. 
Why is point K suboptimal? According to the strategy 






Figure 8. Case of moderate labor shortage 
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optimal point. K is considered here as being suboptimal 
by comparison to other possible strategies and more specifi­
cally in relation to the model I of maximization. The 
simplification of the model I has been made by the way of 
reducing the set of feasible strategies. This was not very 
important so long as the supply function sustained the 
absolute maximum B. But it becomes serious when a shortage 
of labor input occurs. It is obvious that so long as the 
marginal product of labor (EBF curve) is higher than the 
wage rate, any types of firms, competitive or cooperative, 
have some advantage to increase their use of labor. As 
we have seen, the use of the Domar's "pure model" shows 
that the maximization of the dividend rate for a cooperative 
follows exactly the rule of profit maximization common to 
competitive firms. There is then no reason to stop at K. 
But to move ahead from the point K, the' cooperative 
firm needs to employ some extra labor units not attracted 
yet by the two low dividend rate. At this point, any im­
provement in the cooperative situation cannot be made without 
a partial or a complete elimination of the principle of 
uniformity of the dividend rate. Some discrimination among 
members has to be introduced. And the concept of equality 
of members related to the democratic organization of 
cooperatives is slightly affected for the better standing of 
all the members. 
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Model III A new model of maximization, model III, 
can be built. It permits, as model I does, a discrimination 
among members for what concerns the wage rate to be applied. 
Since we want the model to be operational, we drop in 
model I the vector maximization of utility, and we use the 
objective function of model II. We build up a new supply 
function. We describe the supply of labor as being a 
function, not anymore of a unique dividend rate, but of 
wage rates, one for each member. 
The model III can be formulated as follows: 
n-1 
Z p. X. - R 
i=l 9. max p^ = 
10. f(X) = 0 
11. Xn 1 H(Pnl'Pn2'''''Pnm) ' 
The value p^ is a weighted average of the price vector 
,k=l,2,... ,m. The weights are the corresponding ratios 
m 
x^j^/ Z x^jç of labor supplied. As before, the supply function 
11 is equivalent to the one expressed in the model I by 
relations 3 and 4. It presents no theoretical difficulties, 
only its specification could be a problem (175). 
A given supply x^ can be sustained by more than one imputation 
p^^, k=l,2,...,m. As a matter of fact there could be a great 
number of feasible imputations with no possibility to select 
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among them. All of them would not be optimum with regard 
to the objective function, but there is no reason to believe 
that only one would be. 
Our aim now is to develop one optimal imputation 
according to model III. We use for that matter some reasoning 
about the geometrical representation of the problem in 
Figure 9. 
Figure 9 is an exact replicate of the Figure 8 for 
what concerns the three curves already presented. At 
point K, the marginal product of labor is greater than 
the wage rate p^, i.e., KJ. It is then profitable for the 
cooperative firm to hire more people. But no one other 
than those already working is willing to work at the normal 
dividend rate described by the curve ABC, at the point K. 
To get a new worker from the K-equilibrium point, the coopera­
tive needs to offer more than the current dividend rate. 
More specifically, the wage of new hired men should follow 
the HKM supply curve, from K to M. 
Alternative types of imputation An optimal strategy 
for the cooperative is to pay the normal members (Ox*) the 
dividend rate p®, and to act with the others "as a dis­
criminating monopsonist and pay each of them the wage indi­
cated by the supply curve" (8). At M the marginal cost of 
labor (the wage rate of the last unit of labor hired) 




Figure 9. Alternative cooperative strategies in the 
case of moderate labor shortage 
121 
cooperative using that strategy corresponds to the area KJM. 
This profit could be redistributed among the normal members, 
increasing slightly their dividend rate p^. The maximum 
amount of labor used is Ox^ and the maximum average dividend 
distributed among normal and extra members is p^. p^ 
represents the best possible performance. It corresponds 
to the value attached to the area OSKJMN divided by the 
total number of labor units used, Ox^. The corresponding 
imputation is not easily drawn. The former members of the 
cooperative could receive a dividend based upon the sub-
optimal performance, namely p°, slightly increased by a 
value Ap^^o (an additive imputation rule: and 
Z Ap , o = KJM (area); where the k° is a subscript 
k® ^ 
characterizing the former (normal) members). The set of 
extra members (hired members) are paid a wage rate just 
enough to make them participate to the cooperative activity. 
In other words, they are paid the wage indicated by the 
supply curve. Some variant imputation could be proposed 
according to the way the extra-profit KJM is redistributed. 
It is obvious that if the additive imputation rule is followed, 
everybody in the cooperative is made better off by the use 
of the new strategy. The feasible imputations corresponding 
to the maximum performance of model III dominate the type of 
imputation obtained from the use of model II. 
Actually, the cooperative may not be able to act as a 
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discriminating monopsonist, as Domar pointed out (8). 
"The hired members may persuade or force the cooperative 
to hire all of them at the highest wage NM" (8). This is 
not too bad for the cooperative. An extra-profit still 
remains (the area JDM) and could be redistributed to the 
former members. This modified imputation is not comparable 
to the ones obtained above. It dominates nevertheless the 
imputation obtained from the use of model II. The perform­
ance is still p^. But apparently, if labor is homogeneous 
as we assumed and then if the new members do not have 
special skills,the morality of this distribution, not very 
favorable to the former members, could be questioned. 
Domar continues, proposing a compromise between the two 
extreme strategies, saying that 
"... the cooperative may operate like an ordinary 
monopsonist, draw a dotted curve KM' representing 
the marginal labor cost, to its intersection with the 
value of the marginal product curve EBF, employ 
altogether ON' units of labor, pay a wage N'T, and 
make a profit from hiring of UJM'T" (8, p. 744). 
The extra profit is then transferred to the normal members 
to be redistributed among them. But as can be seen in 
Figure 9, this operation reduces the level of activity of 
the cooperative, and at the same time lowers the performance 
from p^ to p^*. This sub-optimal solution is still better 
than the one given by model II, but is in no way as good as 
the one obtained by using the two extreme strategies. As a 
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matter of fact, it is possible to find among the various 
feasible imputations resulting from the compromise some 
imputations comparable to the preceding ones (related to 
the optimal performance), and then dominated by them. 
Two optimal classes of imputations have been derived: 
the first resulting from the use of a perfectly discriminating 
monopsonist strategy for the new hired members and the second 
resulting from the use of a separate two-market type of 
discriminating monopsonist strategy. The use of these two 
strategies or of their variants (in the distribution of the 
extra-profit) assures the cooperative a better position 
whenever a shortage of labor occurs. Note that the use of 
a pure cooperative strategy, what we call actual cooperative 
strategy with reference to most actual cooperative organiza­
tions, leads to a sub-optimal point. It brings to the members 
a lower welfare level. The welfare loss resulting from the 
choice of the pure cooperative strategy can be considered 
as the opportunity cost of the ethical value attached to 
this form of cooperation relative to other more efficient 
forms. A problem is to find what is the real weight of such 
a value in th_- mind of most members and then to determine 
from which level of labor shortage to apply non-pure 
strategies. 
124 
Case of severe labor shortage 
For a steady supply function, a further lowering of 
the ABC curve (dividend rate curve or demand schedule for 
labor), either by an increase in the rent R or by a general 
lowering of the firm output prices (input prices being 
maintained to their preceding level), results in the pure 
cooperative strategy equilibrium K moving to the lower 
left of the Figure 9. The same effect would be observed 
when prices and rent remain constant while the labor is 
leaving the cooperative area for nonfarm employment. 
The labor supply function shifts to the left bringing down 
the point K of supply and demand equilibrium (at a uniform 
price). 
The effect of labor migration or of a rent increase is 
easier to observe than the effect of a price change (input 
or output) because price changes do affect the marginal 
product of labor curve. We will then concentrate on these 
two variables, labor supply and rent, and try to make explicit 
the effects on the cooperative organization of a rapid 
change of their values towards the extremes. We will also 
see how some kind of compensatory adjustments could be 
devised. 
People migrate for a variety of reasons. The people 
most tempted to migrate are the ones which normally do not 
accept low wages. In the supply function of Figure 9, these 
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people could be located towards the top of the HKM curve. 
If the dividend rate p® is considered by the workers as 
being very low, and if better job opportunities are apparent 
elsewhere, nothing but effective restraint minimizing worker 
displacement could prevent the labor movement. The labor 
supply curve is shifted to the left and, ceteris paribus, 
the pure cooperative equilibrium strategy K is lowered along 
the ABC curve. This lowers the dividend rate and accele­
rates the departure of labor. If the cooperative continues 
to follow its pure strategy, the movement would soon become 
irreversible, and the firm would disappear altogether with 
the cooperative. Not any more labor is supplied at any 
feasible dividend rate, i.e., no common point K between 
supply of labor and demand of labor curves exists anymore. 
If the disappearance of the cooperative is not desirable 
for social or economic reasons, and if for ethical reasons 
the use of pure cooperative strategy is required, one way 
to save the situation is to play judiciously with the rent 
level. A decrease in the rent improves the economic situation 
of the firm cooperative. It shifts up the ABC curve of 
Figure 9. 
Given that the government agency can and wants to, it 
is possible to shift up the ABC curve of dividend rate until 
the level where, in Figure 10, B approaches to M. At this 
level, perhaps obtained by a negative rent (subsidies), the 
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Figure 10. Case of severe labor shortage 
127 
amount of labor is provided and it is paid by the highest 
possible dividend rate p^. But from the government point 
of view, the cost of the operation is high. It can be 
evaluated by the rectangular area XMVW. 
It is interesting to note that in case where the 
shortage of labor is not critical, a non-pure strategy 
described by model III, where the number of hired members 
is proportionally greater as the shortage is more important, 
will maintain the same amount of labor in the firm as the 
governmental rent operation could do. This would be done 
at a least cost from the government's point of view (fixed 
rent). But from the worker's point of view, an inferior 
imputation level would result. Which strategy is preferable 
depends upon the willingness of the government and also 
upon its resource availability. 
Case of excess supply of labor 
Analytically this case is similar to the preceding ones. 
Two cooperative approaches to the problem of excess supply 
of labor can be developed. First, approach using model II 
as the basic framework, i.e., the actual cooperative approach 
where all the labor effectively supplied should be used and 
renumerated at a uniform dividend rate, second, the approach 
using model III as the behavioral framework, i.e., the 
alternative cooperative approach where the amount of labor 
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used is not restricted to the full supply 
(x^ <_ H(p^^, p^2' "" Pnm^ (no free entry to the coopera­
tive) and where the dividend concept is replaced by a non-
homogeneous imputation concept. 
A third approach should be added, describing the be­
havior of most of the Western cooperatives, where the number 
of members can be restricted to a level below the supply, 
and where the uniform dividend principle is respected as in 
model II. This third set of strategies could be described 
by model II': „ , 
n-l 
max p = 
Z p.x. - R 




=n 1 G (P„) . 
The best strategies resulting from each of these 
approaches can be best described by the use of Figure 11. 
The Western cooperative best strategy, i.e., the 
strategy selected by the cooperative firm using the model II' 
to determine its policy, is figured by the choice of the 
point S in Figure 11. This point corresponds to the overall 
optimal dividend rate p^ and to a restricted membership 
described by Ox^. 






Figure 11. Case of excess supply of labor ^ 
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to the strategy selected by the use of the model II, is 
figured by the point M in Figure 11. The point M results 
from the solution of the maximization problem when all the 
labor supplied should be used. The dividend corresponding to 
the amount of labor employed Ox° is p®. It is relatively 
lower than p^ of the preceding cooperative strategy. "The 
actual cooperative" strategy could be called the socialist 
cooperative strategy, since in socialist countries, 
cooperatives stand for economic as well as for social 
objectives, and since in an area, restriction in the use 
of the labor available cannot be made by cooperative without 
serious reasons, full employment being an objective in 
itself. 
Whenever the wage is not restricted to a unique dividend 
rate, i.e., whenever model III substitutes to the preceding 
models as a framework for decision making, considerations 
about the marginal product of labor are being made. The 
observation that an employment of labor corresponding to x^, 
sustaining the optimal dividend rate p^ but leaving un­
employed a lot of people willing to work at a wage inferior 
to the marginal product of their activity provides some 
doubt about the overall efficiency of the best of the two 
preceding cooperative strategies. An even better strategy 
corresponds to the perfectly discriminating monopsonist type 
of cooperative strategy concerning the additional workers 
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(Ox^ being considered as the regular members). The coopera­
tive employs additional workers until their marginal value 
product equates their wage. The wages are in one special 
case equal to the minimum rates at which workers are ready 
to work. In this case, Ox^ figures the amount of labor 
used. The area LBK represents the extra profit to be im­
puted on the regular workers as well as on the additional 
ones. The performance of the firm; p^ (the average 
dividend rate) is smaller than p^. If the cooperative 
feels concerned only about the regular workers, i.e., if 
it considers them as the only real members of the cooperative, 
it can redistribute the extra profit among them. This lifts 
up the dividend rate paid to the normal members to a higher 
level than the overall optimal dividend rate p^. 
From a social point of view, the last solution is not 
perfect. Such discrimination among members could not likely 
be tolerated for a long period of time. But, is the Western 
cooperative solution, which maintains artificial unemployment, 
socially more acceptable? 
An alternative to the extreme discriminating solutions 
would be to pay the hired workers wages equal to their 
respective marginal value products and to maintain the 
regular member dividend rate at the optimum p^. This last 
solution still involves discrimination among workers, but 
it is more easily defensible from a social point of view. 
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An appropriate fiscal policy could save the situation. 
An increase of the rent value would shift down the dividend 
rate curve, and would bring together the points B and M 
at the K level. At K, the amount Ox^ of labor will be used 
(the amount proposed by the last non-pure cooperative 
strategies), and the state will collect an extra amount of 
income represented by the rectangular area QJKN. Such a 
policy adjustment "would require more knowledge and skill 
than are likely to be possessed by the Soviet or, for that 
matter, by most other governments" (8). Nevertheless it is 
this process of adjustment which seems to be used actually 
il"! India where inefficient cooperatives are maintained 
artificially by the government. They receive subsidies 
from the state. That makes us think that they are actually 
working in a permanent state of shortage of resource supply 
(from members). Their activities are less than the ones 
which permit the full employment of the capital invested (the 
fixed inputs). Maybe this government policy in India is 
organized without regard to the feasible optimum which could 
be sustained in any cooperative by a certain activity level. 
Maybe, as Ryan writes in (33) , this policy is justified by 
the necessity to maintain alive some economic institutions 
in the backward countries, to play the role of center of 
development. 
Government adjustment of the rent level of any firms in 
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the socialist countries is a heavy but efficient (if well 
manipulated) policy instrument for better resource allocation 
and also for greater social justice. It is a good instru­
ment to improve the resource allocation in the sense that 
it can help to correct those economic errors derived mostly 
from the neglect of external economies. In this sense the 
rent adjustment policy of the government is the policy 
instrument which links cooperatives together in a generalized 
cooperative organization. Only the Domar's judgement (8) 
relative to the practical difficulties of applying correctly 
such a policy at a state level introduces some kind of 
restriction to the extent of our conclusions. Maybe the 
development of the knowledge of methods of decomposition 
in programming will bring to the socialist states a better 
way to master their planification problems. The use of the 
Dantzig and Wolfe decomposition algorithm (6) for a block-
triangular type L.P. model could be a useful tool. In 
that two-sector I..P. model, the rent adjustment policy 
could figure the center type of operation. The iterative 
way in which the reallocation of capital (by application of 
differential rents) between the firms or even between the 
industries of the state could be directed by an overall 
performance function. At this point, the two level planning 
method of Kornai and Liptak (18), "where the resource vector 
is reshuffled sequentially to attain conformability and 
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optimality of the sector programs with the overall program" 
(39), seems more appropriate. The problem is to develop 
an optimal allocation of capital among sectors by a rent 
adjustment policy from the center. 
Planification and Production Adjustment 
Our objective is to investigate the comparative produc­
tion flexibility of the different cooperative strategies 
generalized to the industry level. This concerns the short 
run adjustment to market demand. 
Assume that the center (the industry planning bureau) 
knows the demand pattern for the final product of the industry 
corresponding to any price pattern, i.e., 
= Xo + Dp 
where p stands for the price vector of the industry outputs. 
The center furthermore disposes of a policy instrument 
over the industry and simultaneously over the demand of 
the industry final products: the price vector p. 
The center can change p in any direction in an attempt 
to develop a market equilibrium: 
Xg = Xg (supply = demand). 
A pricing rule could be used, in the process of economic 
adjustment between supply and demand; 
Ap = r(X^ - Xg); 
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where r is a positive scalar number. 
A more sophisticated method and also a more interesting 
one for planification purpose could be used here. The 
decomposition algorithm of Dantzig and Wolfe seems to 
provide a good framework for the problem at hand. Our 
objective now is not to develop fully the method, but 
rather to show how it could be used to solve a practical 
planning problem. 
In the Dantzig and Wolfe decomposition algorithm, the 
center strategy set is the feasible firm profit coefficients 
(which could be replaced without loss of generality by the 
output prices). The sector strategy sets are the feasible 
activity levels. Each sector maximizes a function of its 
activity vector subject to some linear constraints best 
represented by 
Xj^   ^ 0 , 3c—1,2,. #. ,m . 
The global requirement is the equality between supply and 
demand : 
m 
k=l ° = *4 = ° P-
The overall program is solved after a finite number of 
iterative steps. 
The center, concerned by the above global requirement. 
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modifies the price vector according to a rule involving 
provisional dual prices (the non-optimum shadow prices 
attached to the demand vector of the global requirement 
relation). The sectors adjust their activity level taking 
into account the price change. 
Since we are not working on a practical problem with 
data and specified production and objective functions, there 
is no interest to develop further the Dantzig and Wolfe 
algorithm. In the following development we will rather use 
the simplified method traced above. Our purpose is to develop 
some theoretical results concerning the comparative use of 
alternative cooperative strategies at the industry level. 
Three types of cooperative strategy will be considered. 
They correspond to the ones already presented in the preceding 
section. Each type of cooperative generalized at the industry 
level will generate a special planning situation we want to 
study. 
To simplify the discussion, we assume that the industry 
is only concerned by the production of one final output to 
be sold on the market. figures the aggregate supply of 
that output. We assume furthermore that the firm 
cooperatives do not pay a rent to the state (R=0). 
Case I 
The industry is exclusively composed of cooperative firms, 
adjusting their activity according to the model II. The 
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objective of each firm is the maximization of a uniform 
dividend rate. All the labor supplied is used. This industry 
with such an organization could be called a socialist type 
of cooperative firm industry. 
Suppose that at the actual price level, say p(0), all 
the cooperatives are working at the "normal capacity of 
production" (17) (at minimum average cost of production) 
sustaining the overall optimal dividend rate. In other 
words, the price level and the supply of labor sustain the 
overall dividend rate in every cooperative of the industry. 
This situation is described in Figure 12. 
Nevertheless, at p(0), the market is not in equilibrium: 
Xs < Xd = Xo + D p(0) . 
The pricing rule is used by the center, and a new price 
level is developed as follows : 
Ap = r (X^ - Xg) , 
p(l) = p(0) + Ap. 
An increase in the output price results, at the firm level, 
in a proportional shift upwards of the dividend rate curve 
as well as of the marginal product of labor curve. The new 
overall optimum B' still corresponds to the preceding one 
for what concerns the use of labor x^. But the strategy 
selected by the type of cooperative considered is characterized 
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Figure 12. Activity adjustments to changes in the 
'' cooperative output price; alternative 
strategies 
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by the choice of the sub-optimal point M, involving an 
increase in the labor used from x to x®. This short run 
n n 
increase in the labor used, from the production point of 
view, characterizes an increase of the cooperative activity 
over its normal capacity. An increase in production results. 
The change in the price of the output affects the market 
both from the supply and from the demand sides. The socialist 
cooperative firm industry reacts positively to price policy. 
Case II 
The industry is exclusively composed of cooperative firms 
adjusting their activity according to the model II'. The 
objective of each firm is the maximization of a uniform 
dividend rate. The labor supply is used fully or partially 
so as to sustain the overall dividend rate optimum. 
This industry could be called Western type of cooperative 
firm industry. 
The analysis of the effect of price change on the 
cooperative activity is made. Suppose that all the firms 
at the beginning are working at their normal capacity of 
production (the point B of Figure 12). An increase in the 
output price will not affect the activity level of the firms. 
B' will be selected. The dividend rate will be higher. 
Although the supply of labor is more important, only Ox^ 
will be used as before. This cooperative system seems not 
responsive, from the production side, to price changes in the 
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upward direction. A change in price of the output in the 
downward direction would bring a lowering of the dividend 
rate and then a shortage in labor supply. This would make 
the firms work at sub-normal capacity of production. The 
m 
strategies used by this type of cooperatives would be, in 
this last case, analogous to the one used by the socialist 
counterpart in the same situation. The labor supply rules 
the activity level of the firms. 
Case III 
The industry is exclusively composed of cooperative firms 
which adjust their activity according to model III. The 
objective of each firm is the maximization of a weighted 
average dividend rate. The labor is used so far as its 
marginal product is higher than its marginal cost (wage 
which could be made non-uniform). 
According to the same type of analysis as above, the 
first strategy of the firms is to select the point B as 
production equilibrium (the normal capacity of production 
sustained by the supply of labor function). The price 
change in the upward direction will make the firms select 
the equilibrium point K of Figure 12. This point corresponds 
to an intermediate activity level, between the two preceding 
extreme solutions (case I and II). 
A decrease in the output price will show a decrease in 
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the firm activity, but more progressive than the ones ob­
served in the cases I and II. 
The aggregation of the price effects on the firm 
activities at the industry level for any of the three 
considered cases leads to the construction of three industry 
supply curves, one for each case. 
Suppose that at time zero the market equilibrium is 
represented by the common point to all the supply curves and 
to the demand curve D, i.e., X(0) = at the price 
level p(0), whatever the cooperative system which composes 
the industry. An upward shift of the demand e.g., resulting 
from a change in taste, from D to D' occurs in the short 
run. The system of production represented by the case I gives 
the more flexible production pattern. The price change 
resulting from the demand shift is the less important of the 
three cases. 
The system of production represented by the case II is 
not responsive at all to any upward move in the demand and 
consequently in the price. A large change in price is 
necessary to obtain the new equilibrium matching the change 
in demand. As a matter of fact, prices affect only the demand 
side, and the demand sector alone can realize the quantity 
adjustment towards the new equilibrium. 
The system generated by the case III presents an inter­
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Figure 13. Aggregate production supply curves corresponding 
to the cases I, II/ and III 
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demand. This solution is similar in many ways to the per­
fectly competitive type of solution. 
A downward shift in the demand from the original demand 
curve D to D" is matched by a downward change in price and 
in production activity from any of the three systems 
proposed. The systems represented by the cases I and II have 
similar supply patterns. Both systems present very flexible 
production patterns (the flexibility depending directly on 
the shape of the aggregate labor supply curve). Less 
flexible is the supply pattern of system III. This system 
matches demand shift by a relatively more important lowering 
of the price level, which still sustains a higher production 
activity than the other two systems. 
From a social point of view, and then from a plannifica-
tion point of view, the systems I and III are not so bad. 
They provide industry supply functions sensible to price 
changes in the short run. The price fluctuations resulting 
from shifts in demand is then dampened. Production from 
these two systems seems to adjust itself quite well to 
demand. Comparatively the system II does not behave well 
for upward shift in demand. This system provides an in­
elastic supply curve so far excess supply of labor exists. 
Such an industry would not be easy to manipulate in the short 




The classical economic framework used in this chapter 
permits us to show evidence of an interdependence between 
the production activity and the distribution activity of the 
cooperative. The dependence of the distribution activity 
from the production activity has been already shown in the 
preceding chapters. It was mostly expressed by the fact 
that a globally efficient cooperative may lead to an indi­
vidually efficient solution by the use of an appropriate 
imputation (the multiplicative imputation was an example). 
The dependence of the production activity from the distri­
bution activity has been developed in this chapter. The 
type of imputation used in the distribution of the outcome 
of the cooperative among members has an influence on the 
level of production activity of the cooperative. 
Two types of "pure" cooperative have been considered; 
the Western type and the socialist type of cooperative. Both 
use a uniform imputation (dividend type of imputation) of 
the cooperative outcome among members. The only difference 
is in the constraints. The socialist type of cooperative is 
implicitly required to use all the labor willing to work at 
the dividend rate renumeration. The Western type (or 
capitalist type) of cooperative is not subjected to that 
constraint; it can use the amount of labor consistent with 
its objective of dividend rate maximization. 
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In case of shortage in the supply of labor, i.e., the 
labor supply does not sustain the normal capacity of produc­
tion (17) of the firm cooperative, the Western and the social­
ist types of cooperative use the same strategy. They select 
the level of activity for which the uniform dividend rate 
(to be maximized) cannot be improved. If we define the 
dividend rate curve as the net average revenue of labor 
curve of the firm and the supply of labor curve as the 
schedule of marginal cost of labor, we see that the two 
types of cooperatives select their equilibrium activities 
of production at a level where the average revenue equates 
the marginal cost. The fact that in the case of labor 
shortage the average revenue of labor is still rising in 
the section considered shows that the "pure" cooperative 
equilibrium corresponds to an activity level where the 
marginal revenue of labor is greater than its marginal cost. 
In the case of excess supply of labor (still relative 
to the normal capacity of production of the firm cooperative), 
the Western type of cooperative utilizes the amount of labor 
consistent with the normal capacity of the firm, i.e., it 
employs labor up to the point where the marginal revenue of 
labor equates the dividend rate (average revenue of labor). 
At this point clearly, the marginal cost of labor is lower 
than its marginal revenue. The socialist type of cooperative 
employs labor up to the point where the marginal cost of 
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labor (supply of labor curve) equates the dividend rate. 
At this point, the marginal cost of labor is higher than 
its marginal revenue. 
We could say from a welfare economic standpoint (marginal 
conditions of welfare maximization (4)) that in case of 
shortage of labor, both "pure" cooperatives do not go far 
enough in their production activity, but that in case of 
excess of labor, one goes too far; the socialist type, and 
the other still not far enough: the Western type. 
An attempt has been made to develop alternative coopera­
tive strategies which take account of marginal conditions 
in the selection of the activity level of the firm (coopera­
tive firm). But the actual (pure) cooperative aspect of 
such alternative strategies is affected in the sense that 
the concept of uniform dividend rate among members is lost. 
A nonuniform imputation is substituted for the dividend type 
of imputation most commonly used. 
The modification of the "pure" cooperative strategy 
into a "non-pure" cooperative strategy makes the firm 
cooperative more independent of the incentives resulting from 
ratio-maximization: the "ratio incentive" as Kornai and 
Liptak call it (17). As a matter of fact, the use of non­
uniform imputation of the outcome of the cooperative among 
the members leads the manager of the cooperative to conform 
to a type of rationality consistent with the incentive of 
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sum-maximization (like the maximization of the total profit 
of the normal competitive entrepreneur): the "sum incen­
tive" (17). The welfare improvement resulting from such a 
modification of the distribution rule within the cooperative 
is obvious. The marginal conditions guide the new type of 
cooperative (one of the important conditions for welfare 
maximization (4)); the production activity level of the firm 
cooperative is generally improved (higher than the Western 
type of cooperative in both cases of shortage and excess 
supply of labor, and also higher than the socialist type of 
cooperative in the case of shortage in the supply of labor); 
and the amount of utility distributed in the form of wages 
is consequently increased. 
The opportunity cost of the use of the alternative 
cooperative strategies may be high. It corresponds to the 
subjective cost of not considering ethical consideration as 
the equality of human being and their right to be treated 
as such. For most believers in cooperation, the use of a 
nonuniform imputation of the cooperative outcome among 
members without any explicit justification of nonhomogeneity 
of the resource provided by them (labor) would be in­
admissible. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
In the real world individuals are faced with the choice 
among a great number of strategies. We are only concerned 
throughout this study with the attitude of individuals to­
wards the cooperative strategy in opposition to the compe­
titive one. This caricature of reality (since different 
levels of cooperation and competition coexist) is a 
necessary simplification in the theoretical approach we use. 
The present study deals with the concept of efficiency 
of cooperative organizations relative to noncooperative 
organizations. The efficiency concept is essentially a 
relative notion. We say that a strategy is efficient if its 
outcome is undominated by the possible outcomes of any 
other strategies. In the study, two strategies are compared: 
the cooperative and the competitive strategies. The coopera­
tive strategy is an efficient strategy whenever its outcome 
dominates the outcome of the alternative strategy. 
The general concept of efficiency is divided into two 
more specific concepts: the global efficiency and the indi­
vidual efficiency concepts. The global efficiency concept 
applies at the level of the group or coalition. The 
cooperative strategy is globally efficient whenever the total 
outcome of the coalition is undominated by the aggregate 
outcome of the same group of people using the alternative 
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strategy, i.e., when the total outcome of the coalition 
(cooperative) is greater than the sum of the individual 
outcomes of each member acting independently (using a 
noncooperative strategy). The individual efficiency 
concept applies at the level of the individuals. A 
cooperative is individually efficient if all the indi­
viduals are made better off by the use of their cooperative 
strategies relative to their competitive strategies. 
The decision theory, in the first chapter, shows why 
and how individuals are making decisions. It considers 
and puts in evidence the fact that individuals are eco­
nomically interdependent. The partial control that an 
individual has on the welfare and then on the decision of 
other individuals in the backbone of the cooperative as 
well as of the competitive economic theory. 
The second chapter presents a game theory approach to the 
analysis of cooperative organization. A direct application 
of this approach is found in individual and group bargaining 
activities. The approach seems particularly well adapted to 
the study of the way individuals group into coalitions. The 
concept of coalition is directly related to the idea of 
cooperation. Coalitions are defined as groups of individuals 
who agree on common objectives and on the strategy to be 
used to realize these objectives. The coalition concept 
is synonymous to the very general cooperative concept. 
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The advantage of the game theory approach is to provide u. 
with a piece of theoretical development concerning coalition 
formation and the construction of a best coalition structure. 
In the real world, the efficiency of a cooperative 
organization is directly related to the nature of the coali­
tion it represents. A good coalition of individuals, i.e., 
a coalition described simultaneously by a payoff configura­
tion individually and coalitionally rational, may lead to 
an efficient cooperative organization. The quality of the 
coalition is a necessary condition for cooperative 
efficiency. 
The distinction between the concepts of individual and 
coalition rationality permits us to differentiate between 
two processes: the process of collusion of individuals into 
a coalition according to individual rationality, and the 
process of collusion of coalitions into a supercoalition 
according to coalition rationality. These two concepts of 
rationality at the individual and at the coalition levels 
relate to the more specific concepts of individual and global 
efficiencies in an economic context. 
The analysis of resource cooperatives permits us to 
relate the idea of controllability with the more specific 
concept of external effect. The existence of external 
economies, i.e., social profit which can be made by taking 
account of external effects among firms, may be considered as 
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an important factor in the development of cooperatives. 
A resource cooperative is a coalition of entrepreneurs 
(individuals) who agree on the reallocation of resources 
among their firms as a means to maximize their profits. 
The process of optimal reallocation of resources among 
firms of the same coalition is best described by the Kornai 
and Liptak decomposition algorithm (programming approach). 
The center, i.e., the manager of the cooperative, reallo­
cates the aggregate resource vector among firms according to 
the individual performances of the firms. Given the new 
resource distribution, the entrepreneurs maximize their 
profit by selecting a level of activity (L.P. problem). 
The sequence of fictitious plays between the center and the 
tecun of entrepreneurs is shown to converge towards a global 
optimum solution. At this point, the allocation of resources 
among the cooperating firms is optimal; the resource coopera­
tive is globally efficient. A side payment or an imputation 
of the outcome among the cooperative members completes the 
process. 
The Kornai and Liptak programming framework may also 
be used in the determination of a best coalition structure 
among firms of an industry, when resources as well as 
activities are pooled. 
The classical economic approach to the firm cooperative 
(fourth chapter) permits us to describe the interaction 
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between individual rationality and coalition rationality. 
An interaction between the concepts of individual and global 
efficiency exists. The type of imputation (distribution 
of outcome among members) used is directly related to the 
concept of individual efficiency. Different types of impu­
tation can be developed as alternatives to the uniform 
dividend distribution most commonly used. These types of 
imputation affect differently the activity level of the 
cooperative and then its global efficiency level. 
Conclusion 
The individual decision process is related directly to 
the individual cost-benefit calculation. Individual decision 
theory shows that individuals are much concerned, in the 
choice of their best strategy, by the expected outcome of 
their own decision. Whenever there exists some sort of 
controllability among people, the process of decision is not 
affected; only the decision is affected, along with the 
resulting outcome. Individual behavior is the most important 
element in this study. It determines most of the results 
concerning the efficiency of the cooperative strategy con­
sidered globally or individually. 
The global or collective efficiency of the cooperative 
productive solution is unambiguous. At each stage of 
cooperation considered, from the bargaining cooperative to 
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the complete firm cooperative, some factors determining the 
global efficiency of the cooperative solution have been 
specified. The bargaining power of individuals which 
cumulates into coalition bargaining power according to some 
unknown but very decisive super additivity rule, has been 
considered as being the first argument in favor of coopera­
tion. The existence of external economies among the production 
processes of various firms of the same area also sometimes 
plays a role in the creation of new cooperatives. But 
since the external economies are not very often apparent 
to the entrepreneurs because of their nature this effect has 
not the practical importance it should have. A most important 
element determining in some sense the collective efficiency 
of the cooperative solution is the imperfection in the 
resource market among firms. The cooperative strategy, 
best described by the Kornai-Liptak two-level planning scheme, 
is shown to force a reallocation of resources among firms 
in such a way as to establish a competitive type of perfect 
resource market equilibrium. The cooperative strategy in 
this type of situation helps to correct market imperfections. 
It improves artificially exchanges between firms in such a 
way as to bring the industry (or a portion of the industry) 
in a perfectly competitive market type situation for the 
resource distribution. The introduction of activity 
aggregation as well as of resource aggregation among firms 
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cooperating together brings an argument in favor of the 
cooperative strategy mostly founded on the belief that, in 
some cases increasing returns to scale (derived from indi­
visibility of production means) prevails. 
All these arguments, from the bargaining power to the 
resource and activity aggregations, are in favor of the 
cooperative strategy from a global efficiency point of view. 
But, few individuals are more concerned by the overall wel­
fare than by their own welfare. This forces us to consider 
the possible effect of a global welfare improvement on the 
individual welfare. If all individuals are made better off 
by cooperation, then the use of the individual cooperative 
strategy is fully justified, and the restricted extent of 
cooperatives in the world should be discussed and explained 
by non-economic considerations. But the actual imputation 
rule used by the cooperatives to distribute the extra profit 
among the members shows some weakness. It does not assure 
the individuals that they get more by using their cooperative 
strategy than by not doing so. The dividend type of im­
putation (uniform imputation) does not take account of the 
relative ability of some individuals to get more out of a 
fixed amount of resources than other individuals. It does 
not take account of personal abilities. It uniformizes 
people in their activities of bargaining, or producing and 
even of working. Although the actual cooperative solution is 
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globally efficient (undominated) in most cases, most of the 
time the cooperatives cannot create unanimity and then cannot 
develop over an area with the participation of all the con­
cerned individuals. The type of imputation they use is an 
important reason of the non-participation of individuals 
in cooperatives. These individuals can obtain by themselves 
more than they could get being members of the cooperative. 
A multiplicative imputation, which respects the ranking 
of the individual performances before the cooperative 
takes place, would reasonably assure a participation of all 
the individuals in the cooperative. Everybody would be 
made better off inside the cooperative. But such an imputa­
tion may be considered by most of the believers in cooperation 
as a heresy. 
The limited extent of the individual participation in 
cooperatives results also because of miscalculation from 
the leaders of the movement. They often do not distinguish 
between global and individual efficiencies. The leaders, 
sure of the efficacy of the cooperative principle, expect a 
massive participation in the movement. They develop then a 
big scale cooperative to match the expected supply of inputs 
provided by potential members. And the individual decision 
maker, taking account of individual expected advantage and 
then very much concerned by the nature of the imputation, 
determines the participation in the cooperative. That 
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participation sometimes appears to be deceptive. The over­
capacity of the cooperative, which translates into shortage 
of some inputs provided by members, leads to a sub-optimal 
global solution, and then to a sub-optimal imputation, and 
consequently to even less participation. This vicious 
circle develops like the spiral deflation of Harrod. It is 
often the way a cooperative disappears, unless a sufficient 
external support (from the state) helps to break the closed 
circuit of disintegration. 
An aspect of the subject we did not consider until now 
is the fact that cooperatives often improve the economic 
(more often the bargaining) situation of the non-cooperators. 
Whenever a majority of individuals use their cooperative 
strategy, it is often beneficial for the remaining individ­
uals not to do so. The example of cooperatives concerned 
by supply reduction of final outputs to maintain high market 
prices shows well the advantage of not cooperating, i.e., 
by realizing profits from the strong market demand and 
selling at high prices. The bargaining game could be an 
essential game; this does not preclude the benefit of not 
participating in a coalition whenever others do so. This 
kind of situation is described in game theory as "the 
prisoner's dilemma". The importance of this dilemma for 
what concerns the cooperative development is striking. 
Hallberg (14, p. 188) presents a real case which shows the 
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advantage a cooperative gives to non-cooperators and the 
feedback it brings to them. 
"Two handlers with which one cooperative attempted to 
bargain were able to get an adequate supply of milk 
from independent producers and were even willing 
to pay these producers five cents per hundredweight 
more than the cooperative was asking. In the 
manager's opinion these two handlers were "out to ruin 
the cooperative'." 
The independent producers are finding some advantage not 
to play their cooperative strategy. The trouble is that the 
cooperative, blocked by its rigid imputation process (dividend 
type of imputation), has no counter strategy to such treat­
ment from the handlers. A multiplicative type of imputation 
taking account of the bargaining ability of the independent 
producers may attract them into the cooperative, and then 
present a good counter treat to the handlers. 
In the socialist countries, cooperatives, as kolkhozes, 
are often considered as a transition between capitalist 
enterprises and public enterprises. This idea of transition 
is mostly justified by the fact that cooperatives by their 
organization and by their advantages are very close to what 
is usually called a public firm. Tinbergen writes in (43), 
"... A modern welfare theory teaches us the necessity 
of a public sector on the basis of purely economic 
arguments and deviates obviously from the Paretian 
tendency for the defense of pure liberalism. 
...Vilfredo Pareto's theory is obsolete mainly because 
he does not take into consideration two characteristics 
of modern production which, precisely, constitute the 
justification of a public sector: external effects 
and indivisible means of production." 
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The cooperative firm takes account of both "external 
effects and indivisible means of production", at least within 
the coalition which defines the cooperative. The size of 
the coalition, which corresponds to the state size for 
public firm, gives a limit to the analogy. 
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